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TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS                                         
ABSTRACT 
 
  
 
 
 This essay, by thoroughly analyzing Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.’s performance as 
Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities during the 
Watergate public hearings, examines whether Senator Baker, as the highest-ranking Republican 
on the committee, sought primarily to protect his own party’s President or, rather, in the spirit of 
bipartisanship, sought primarily to uncover the truth surrounding the Watergate affair, regardless 
of political implications, for the betterment of the American people.  Based on my findings, I 
conclude that Senator Baker, throughout the hearings of the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, favored the exposure of the truth – even at the expense of 
exposing his own party’s President.   
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To my mom and dad, who have always been there for me and exemplified, through their actions, 
the true value of hard work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“Hold it, come out” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 105).   
This command, made before the break of dawn on June 17, 1972, by Washington, D.C. 
police officer John Barrett to five men caught burglarizing the Democratic National Committee 
offices located within the Watergate complex, was the igniting spark to a blazing inferno that 
would fiercely capture the attention of a nation and ultimately lead to the downfall of a President 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  The arrest of the Watergate burglars made it to the pages of the Washington 
Post the next day in the form of an article by Alfred Lewis, Carl Bernstein, and Bob Woodward 
(“Watergate”, 2013).  However, thanks to “a successful White House public relations campaign”, 
media reports initially did not link President Nixon, his executive officials, or the Committee To 
Re-Elect the President to the break-in (“Watergate”, 2013).  The Watergate scandal had little to 
no negative impact on President Nixon’s 1972 reelection odds, as he “was reelected in a historic 
landslide–winning all but Massachusetts and the District of Columbia” (“Watergate”, 2013).   
Shortly before President Nixon’s second inauguration, Judge John Sirica presided over 
“[t]he trial of the five arrested burglars and two accomplices”; the men were indicted “on charges 
of burglary, conspiracy, and violation of federal wiretapping laws” (“Watergate”, 2013).  Five of 
the seven defendants entered a guilty plea, while the remaining two were convicted by month’s 
end (“Watergate”, 2013).  Sentencing was scheduled for the end of March (“Watergate”, 2013). 
In the meantime, the legislative branch decided to launch its own investigation 
(“Watergate”, 2013).  On February 7, 1973, the United States Senate unanimously adopted 
Senate Resolution 60, creating the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
(United States Senate, 1974).  The objective of this committee, according to the resolution, was:  
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[T]o conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, 
improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any persons, acting either 
individually or in combination with others, in the presidential election of 1972, or 
in any related campaign or canvass conducted by or in behalf of any person 
seeking nomination or election as the candidate of any political party for the 
office of President of the United States in such election, and to determine whether 
in its judgment any occurrences which may be revealed by the investigation and 
study indicate the necessity or desirability of the enactment of new congressional 
legislation to safeguard the electoral process by which the President of the United 
States is chosen.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 427) 
The resolution gave committee members the power “to subpoena witnesses and materials, 
provided them with a $500,000 budget, and required them to submit a final report by February 
28, 1974” (“Senate”, p. 1).  According to Senator Sam Ervin, who spearheaded the resolution 
and served as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 
Senate Resolution 60 “directed the Select Committee to make one of the most comprehensive 
investigations in the history of Congress” (United States Senate, 1974, p. VII).  While Senate 
Resolution 60 clearly covered a wide array of issues, this paper exclusively focuses on the 
investigation on the part of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
into the Watergate break-in and its subsequent cover-up (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., who had, upon the creation of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, known Richard Nixon for over twenty years, 
became Vice-Chairman of the committee (MacPherson, 1973 & “Baker”).  Nixon had assisted 
with Senator Baker’s 1966 campaign (MacPherson, 1973).  Senator Baker had returned the favor 
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by giving a seconding speech for Nixon in 1968 (MacPherson, 1973).  President Nixon even 
went so far as to select Senator Baker for a seat on the Supreme Court; as the story goes, 
however, “after having dithered for a day, Senator Baker decided to accept the seat, but by that 
time President Nixon had changed his mind and offered the nomination instead to William 
Rehnquist” (MacPherson, 1973 & Rosen, 2012, p. 49).  As the principal voice of the Republican 
Party on a committee investigating the alleged wrongdoings of a Republican Presidential 
administration headed by a personal and political ally, Senator Baker was undoubtedly in a 
challenging position.  This essay, by thoroughly analyzing Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.’s 
performance as Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities during the Watergate public hearings, examines whether Senator Baker, as the highest-
ranking Republican on the committee, sought primarily to protect his own party’s President or, 
rather, in the spirit of bipartisanship, sought primarily to uncover the truth surrounding the 
Watergate affair, regardless of political implications, for the betterment of the American people.   
We begin by taking a look at the necessary background information on the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and by analyzing Senator Baker’s opening 
statement.  We then get into the heart of the essay by examining Senator Baker’s witness 
questionings of a significant sampling of key actors in the Watergate break-in and the subsequent 
cover-up.  The first five witnesses – Paul Leeper, Carl Shoffler, James McCord, Bernard Barker, 
and Alfred Baldwin – were involved in the June 17, 1972, break-in at the Democratic National 
Committee headquarters within the Watergate Complex, either on the right or wrong side of the 
law.  The final four witnesses – John Dean, John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman, and H. R. 
Haldeman – were major players in the cover-up of the Watergate affair.  Personal backgrounds 
are provided prior to delving into the testimony of each witness, and thematic analyses are 
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developed from the predominant topics addressed by Senator Baker throughout his questioning 
of each witness.   
These thematic analyses provide a clearer lens into arriving at a verdict as to whether 
Senator Baker was more focused on uncovering the truth or on protecting President Nixon.  
Before proclaiming my personal verdict, however, I examine how Senator Baker was perceived 
in the press during the public hearings.  Also, each chapter begins with a snippet of a 
conversation from the Nixon tapes relating to Senator Baker.  These glimpses into the mind of 
President Nixon reveal the progression of the President’s true feelings regarding Senator Baker 
throughout the Watergate saga and serve as introductions to some of Nixon’s key aides.  The 
essay concludes with a look into Senator Baker’s reflections of the Watergate era, my 
suggestions for the future based on my research of Senator Baker during the Watergate public 
hearings, and Senator Baker’s career post-Watergate.  
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PART I 
PRELUDE TO THE 
HEARINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
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Nixon:   “[Y]ou should talk to Baker and Ervin and be sure that Baker’s back, you keep it good and stiff.” 
- 3/1/1973 CONVERSATION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD KLEINDIENST (KUTLER, 1997, PP. XI & 216) 
 
MEET THE COMMITTEE 
 
 
 
Throughout the summer of 1973, Americans were glued to their television sets to witness 
the Watergate public hearings (Garay).  The hearings, which began on May 17, had assumed 
over three hundred hours of television by August 7 of the same year (Garay).  Let’s begin with a 
look into those in charge of the hearings by examining the backgrounds of each committee 
member and the lead counsel for both the majority and the minority.   
Samuel James Ervin, Jr., born in 1896, was the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee 
on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Ervin”).  Ervin was a Democratic Senator from the state 
of North Carolina who began his Senate service in 1954 (“Ervin”).  In 1917, Ervin completed his 
undergraduate degree at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and then served with the 
First Division in France during World War I from 1917 until 1919 (“Ervin”).  Ervin then went on 
to attend Harvard Law School, where he graduated in 1922 (“Ervin”).  Upon law school 
graduation, Ervin began his practice of law in Morganton, North Carolina (“Ervin”).  After two 
judgeship stints at the Burke County Criminal Court and the North Carolina Superior Court, 
respectively, Ervin, in 1946, filled the United States House of Representatives seat once 
occupied by his brother, Joseph Ervin, following his brother’s death (“Ervin”).  Following a 
congressional stint of just shy of a year, Ervin returned to practicing law and soon joined the 
North Carolina Supreme Court as associate justice in 1948, where he stayed until 1954 when he 
was elected to the United States Senate (“Ervin”).  As author of the motion to create the Senate 
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Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Ervin assumed the position of committee 
chairman (Annis, 2007). 
Howard Henry Baker, Jr., born in 1924, was the Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Baker”).  Baker was a Republican Senator 
from the state of Tennessee who began his Senate service in 1967 (“Baker”).  For his 
undergraduate education, Baker attended Tulane University and the University of the South 
(“Baker”).  Baker, like Ervin, followed-up his undergraduate education with a stint in the 
military; his service was in the United States Navy from 1943 until 1946 (“Baker”).  Baker then 
went on to graduate from the University of Tennessee College of Law in 1949 (“Baker”).  Baker 
began his practice of law and then decided to run in 1964 as a candidate for the United States 
Senate (“Baker”).  Baker was defeated in 1964 but ran again as a candidate for the United States 
Senate in 1966, this time finding success (“Baker”).  Baker subsequently won reelection in 1972 
(“Baker”).   
Senator Baker’s involvement with the Watergate public hearings began even before the 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities officially existed; Senator Baker 
favored the idea of an evenly split six-member committee over Senator Ervin’s proposal to create 
a committee composed of four Democrats and three Republicans and, thus, made an amendment 
to Senator Ervin’s motion to that effect (Annis, 2007).  Even after including in his amendment 
that a tie would go in favor of the chairman’s selected side, the Democrats shot down Senator 
Baker’s amendment (Annis, 2007).  The Senate Republicans nonetheless joined with the Senate 
Democrats to unanimously vote 77 to 0 in favor of Senator Ervin’s motion to create the 
committee (Annis, 2007).  This unanimity amongst Republicans was aided by a promise made by 
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Senator Ervin “to allocate one-third of the funds authorized for staff to the minority” (Annis, 
2007, p. 61).   
Senator Baker then received a phone call during a trip with a Senate delegation in 
Moscow from Senator Hugh Scott (Lacy, 2008).  According to Senator Baker, “Hugh said he 
wanted me to be senior Republican on the [Watergate] committee, and I laughed” and “said 
surely not, Hugh” (Lacy, 2008).  Baker, however, ultimately “agreed to do it” but “did not relish 
the thought” (Lacy, 2008).  Why was Senator Baker chosen as Vice-Chairman?  According to 
Baker biographer Lee Annis, Senator Baker’s selection to and acceptance of the Vice-Chairman 
post of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities came as a result of 
three things:  (1) Senator Baker’s discreet expression of interest to Hugh Scott that he would be a 
part of the committee “under certain conditions”; (2) the unanimous inclusion of Senator Baker 
on lists of the top five candidates for committee participation created by Republican Senate 
leaders; and (3) Scott’s assurance that Senator Baker and the other Republican committee 
members could investigate the Watergate scandal independently (Annis, 2007, p. 62).  Baker 
himself, however, remarked years later, “I . . . to this day do not know how I became Vice-
Chairman of the committee except that Hugh Scott was Republican leader” (Lacy, 2008).  He 
continued, “He got to choose the members of that committee – the Watergate committee, and 
there are some who say, I do not believe it for a moment, there are some who say that I was 
named to that committee in punishment for having run against Hugh Scott” for the Minority 
Leader post (Lacy, 2008 & Senate Historical Office).   
Senator Baker early on believed that President Nixon was innocent and that the 
examination into the Watergate affair was simply an attempt by the Democrats “to put a different 
face on a bad defeat”, referring to President Nixon’s dominant victory in the 1972 presidential 
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race (Annis, 2007, p. 63).  Senator Baker, thus, strongly felt that President Nixon’s best strategy 
was to be as open as possible in terms of both himself and his staff (Annis, 2007).  He was 
understandably frustrated when President Nixon apparently decided to go in the opposite 
direction by not allowing his presidential staff members to come before the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities; for precisely this reason, Senator Baker met 
with Nixon on February 22, 1973, in the Executive Office Building (Annis, 2007).   
According to Senator Baker, in the meeting, which came at his own request, the pair 
“discussed the situation generally, and then I said I just wanted to let you know that I will protect 
your interest as senior Republican” (Lacy, 2008).  As their meeting was drawing to a close, 
Senator Baker informed Nixon of his friendship with John Mitchell; he said, “[W]e did some 
legal work together – my firm and his firm – and I do hope he doesn’t have any problems” 
(“Lacy, 2008).  President Nixon then looked at Senator Baker and “lowered his voice and said, 
“Well, he may” (Lacy, 2008).  This exchange marked a key moment in Senator Baker’s 
realization that this situation could actually amount to much more than a simple political dirty 
trick by the Democrats (Annis, 2007).  Senator Baker later recalled:  “[T]he light went on in my 
head, and I thought, you know, Baker, you better just put your head down and follow the facts 
wherever they lead you.  You don’t know as much about this as you thought you did” (Lacy, 
2008). 
Daniel Ken Inouye, born in 1924, was a committee member of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Inouye”).  Inouye was a Democratic Senator 
from the state of Hawaii who began his Senate service in 1963 (“Inouye”).  Inouye served in 
World War II from 1943 to 1947 and progressed from private to captain (“Inouye”).  During the 
war, Inouye “lost his right arm” (Annis, 2007, p. 62).  Inouye then graduated from the University 
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of Hawaii in 1950 and from George Washington University Law School in 1952 (“Inouye”).  
Following graduation from law school, Inouye began practicing law in Honolulu, Hawaii 
(“Inouye”).  After stints in both the Territorial House of Representatives and the Territorial 
Senate, Inouye was elected to the United States House of Representatives following Hawaii’s 
introduction as an official state (“Inouye”).  His service in the United States House of 
Representatives lasted from 1959 until 1963, when he transitioned to the United States Senate 
(“Inouye”).  Inouye won reelection in 1968 (“Inouye”).  Senator Ervin urged Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield to tap Senator Inouye for the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities (Annis, 2007).  Senator Inouye “was apprehensive enough to decline the 
offer several times” but eventually agreed to join the committee (Annis, 2007, p. 62).  
Joseph Manuel Montoya, born in 1915, was a committee member of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Montoya”).  Montoya was a Democratic 
Senator from the state of New Mexico who began his Senate service in 1964 (“Montoya”).  For 
his undergraduate education, Montoya went to Regis College in Denver, Colorado (“Montoya”).  
He then received his law degree from Georgetown University Law School in 1938 (“Montoya”).  
Following his law school graduation, Montoya began practicing law in Santa Fe, New Mexico 
(“Montoya”).  After serving in both the New Mexico State House of Representatives and the 
New Mexico State Senate and as New Mexico’s Lieutenant Governor, Montoya won election to 
the United States House of Representatives in 1957 (“Montoya”).  Montoya then transitioned 
from the United States House of Representatives to the United States Senate in 1964, the year 
following Inouye’s House-to-Senate transition (“Montoya”).  Montoya then won reelection in 
1970 (“Montoya”).  Majority Leader Mansfield asked Senator Montoya to be a part of the Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Annis, 2007).  Montoya’s ability to 
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speak Spanish was viewed as a potential valuable asset for questioning the four burglars of 
Cuban American descent (Annis, 2007).  Montoya overcame his initial hesitancy to join the 
committee and signed on (Annis, 2007). 
Herman Eugene Talmadge, born in 1913, was a committee member of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Talmadge”).  Talmadge was a Democratic 
Senator from the state of Georgia who began his Senate service in 1957 (“Talmadge”).  
Talmadge graduated from the University of Georgia Law School in 1936 (“Talmadge”).  He then 
went to Atlanta, Georgia, to begin practicing law (“Talmadge”).  Talmadge served in World War 
II and became a lieutenant commander (“Talmadge”).  After serving as Governor of Georgia, 
Talmadge, in 1956, was elected to the United States Senate (“Talmadge”).  Talmadge went on to 
win reelection in 1962 and 1968 (“Talmadge”).  Similar to Senator Montoya, Senator Talmadge 
overcame his reluctance and agreed to Majority Leader Mansfield’s invitation to join the Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Annis, 2007). 
Edward John Gurney, born in 1914, was a committee member of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Gurney”).  Gurney was a Republican Senator 
from the state of Florida who began his Senate service in 1969 (“Gurney”).  For his 
undergraduate education, Gurney attended Colby College in Waterville, Maine, where he 
graduated in 1935 (“Gurney”).  Gurney’s legal education was acquired at Harvard Law School 
and Duke Law School, where he graduated in 1938 and 1948, respectively (“Gurney”).  Gurney 
began practicing law in New York City in 1938 (“Gurney”).  In 1941, Gurney enlisted in the 
United States Army (“Gurney”).  After fighting in World War II, Gurney moved to Florida to 
practice law (“Gurney”).  Gurney became the mayor of Winter Park, Florida, in 1961 
(“Gurney”).  Gurney was elected as a United States Representative in 1962, and he served in the 
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House from 1963 until 1969, when he transitioned to the United States Senate (“Gurney”).  
When the minority seats of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
needed to be filled, Gurney informed Hugh Scott of his interest (Annis, 2007).  Scott, looking to 
select interested members for the committee, offered a seat to Gurney, and Gurney wasted no 
time in accepting the role (Annis, 2007). 
Lowell Palmer Weicker, Jr., born in 1931, was a committee member of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Weicker”).  Weicker was a Republican 
Senator from the state of Connecticut who began his Senate Service in 1971 (“Weicker”).  For 
his undergraduate education, Weicker attended Yale University, where he earned his degree in 
1953 (“Weicker”).  Prior to commencing his legal education, Weicker served, from 1953 until 
1955, in the United States Army (“Weicker”).  Weicker then attended the University of Virginia 
Law School and graduated in 1958 (“Weicker”).  After serving as a Connecticut State 
Representative, Weicker, in 1968, was elected to the United States House of Representatives 
(“Weicker”).  After a single term in the House, Weicker transitioned to the United States Senate 
(“Weicker”).  Weicker’s path to his seat on the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities mirrors that of Senator Gurney (Annis, 2007).  Both Weicker and Gurney 
thought that being on the committee “would improve their political standings at home” (Annis, 
2007, p. 62). 
Samuel Dash, born in 1925, was chief counsel of the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities (“Samuel”).  Dash served in the United States Army Air Corps 
during World War II as a bombardier navigator (“Samuel”).  After his military service, Dash 
attended and graduated from Harvard Law School (“Samuel”).  After serving as district attorney 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a position he attained in 1955, Dash practiced law at the private 
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level (“Dash”).  Dash was also a legal educator at Georgetown (“Samuel”).  Upon the adoption 
of Senate Resolution 60, Dash was named chief counsel of the resulting Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Samuel”).  A major factor in Senator Ervin’s 
selection of Dash might have been his electronic surveillance expertise (Annis, 2007). 
In choosing his minority counsel, Senator Baker ignored White House suggestions 
(Annis, 2007).  Instead, Baker sought to find “aides whose first loyalties were to the truth and to 
him” (Annis, 2007, p. 62).  While he “got recommendations for distinguished jurists, judges, 
[and] professors”, Senator Baker believed that he didn’t “have time to get acquainted with these 
luminaries of the legal profession” (Lacy, 2008).  Senator Baker’s first choice was Lamar 
Alexander, who had previously served him as a legislative aide, but Alexander turned down the 
post in fear “that his past service with Nixon would put him in the awkward position of 
investigating people with whom he had worked” (Annis, 2007, p. 62).  Senator Baker then turned 
his focus to a man named Fred Thompson, who had worked on his latest Senatorial campaign 
(Annis, 2007).  
Fred Dalton Thompson, born in 1942, became the minority counsel of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Thompson”).  For his undergraduate 
education, Thompson attended Memphis State University, where he graduated in 1964 
(“Thompson”).  Thompson then received his law degree from Vanderbilt University Law School 
in 1967 (“Thompson”).  Thompson served as assistant U.S. attorney in Nashville from 1969 until 
1972, leading up to his selection as the leading Republican attorney on the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Thompson” & Lacy, 2008).  According to 
Senator Baker years later:  “[I]t turned out to be exactly right.  Fred did a spectacularly good job” 
(Lacy, 2008). 
TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS Borns 14
Thompson called upon Howard Liebengood, who he had known since their days at 
Vanderbilt University Law School, to assist him with his legal work for the committee (Annis, 
2007).  For his deputy, Thompson chose Donald Sanders, a “former FBI agent who had spent 
four years as chief counsel to the House Internal Security Committee” (Annis, 2007, p. 62).  
Senator Baker’s directive to his entire staff was to follow each lead and “let the chips fall where 
they may” (Annis, 2007, p. 63).   
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THE HEARINGS 
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Nixon:   “I find that somebody’s got to get Baker–” 
Dean:   “Pulled around.  He’s off the reservation, I would say.” 
Nixon:  . . . “Baker–I just wonder if he’ll survive the election.  Baker may not realize it, but by getting on 
the wrong side of this we will destroy . . . his chances ever to move into a leadership position.  We 
will destroy it.” 
 - 3/16/1973 CONVERSATION WITH COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT JOHN W. DEAN III (KUTLER, 1997, PP. X & 231-232) 
 
ANALYSIS OF SENATOR BAKER’S OPENING STATEMENT 
 
 
 
Thursday, May 17, 1973, marked the first day of the public hearings before the Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Hearings”, 1973).  On that day, the 
Senators began the hearings by each giving their own opening statements, beginning with 
Senator Ervin (“Hearings”, 1973).  At the conclusion of his statement, Senator Ervin said, 
“[F]irst I recognize the vice chairman of the committee, Senator Howard Baker, who has been 
most alert and most cooperative in the work of the committee” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 4).  In his 
book The Whole Truth:  The Watergate Conspiracy, Senator Ervin included excerpts of and 
briefly commented on each opening statement (Ervin, 1980).  In a similar fashion, the following 
are my reflections upon Senator Baker’s opening statement.  Closely examining Senator Baker’s 
opening statement is a crucial step towards understanding his role as Vice-Chairman of the 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, because his opening statement 
sets the tone for his questioning during the public hearings. 
 To begin his opening statement, Senator Baker concisely emphasized the vast importance 
of the hearings.  He made clear that “[t]he very integrity of our political process itself” has been 
put at stake as a result of the Watergate affair (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 4).  Senator Baker continued 
by making a necessary distinction between a congressional committee and a court of law 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  He said that, due to this distinction, the committee members “do not sit to 
TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS Borns 17
pass judgment on the guilt or innocence of anyone” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 5).  Senator Baker 
went on to clearly explain the purpose of the committee – “to achieve a full discovery of all of 
the facts that bear on the subject of this inquiry” and “to assemble those facts into a coherent and 
intelligible presentation and to make recommendations to the Congress for any changes in statute 
law or the basic charter document of the United States that may seem indicated” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 5).  At this point in his opening statement, Senator Baker had essentially laid out the 
collective mission statement of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  Americans watching the hearings on television throughout the nation 
undoubtedly found this introductory information immensely helpful. 
 Senator Baker then shifted his discussion from the role of the Watergate committee to the 
role of the American people, referring to the American people as “the final judge of Watergate” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 5).  He suggested that the American people should approach the Watergate 
hearings with a critical mindset – that they should consider the implications of Watergate with a 
focus on improving the future instead of on consuming the titillating facts in preparation for the 
next day’s water cooler discussion (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker then admitted that he previously had concerns that the committee hearings 
“might become a partisan effort by one party to exploit the temporary vulnerability of another” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 5).  He mentioned the fact that he offered an amendment to Senator Ervin’s 
resolution that would have equaled the number of Democrats and Republicans on the committee 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  After explaining that his amendment failed, Senator Baker acknowledged 
that “[t]he integrity and fairness of each member of this committee and of its fine professional 
staff” had eradicated his concerns regarding potential loss of impartiality within the committee 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 5).  Senator Baker then struck at the heart of this thesis by asserting that 
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the committee investigation “is not in any way a partisan undertaking, but, rather it is a bipartisan 
search for the unvarnished truth” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 5).   
Senator Baker then proceeded “with a few thoughts on the political process in this 
country” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 5).  Instead of focusing on the negative side effects of the 
Watergate affair, Senator Baker elected to take a glass-half-full approach by focusing on what 
had gone right (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker posited, “[T]he very fact that we are now 
involved in the public process of cleaning our own house, before the eyes of the world, is a mark 
of the greatest strength” (“Hearings”, 1973 p. 5).   
Senator Baker then stressed the importance of America’s partisan political system,  
“[T]he two-party system, in my judgment, is as integral and as important to our form of 
governance as the three formal branches of the central Government themselves” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 6).  Senator Baker then turned somber as he warned that a loss of faith in that system 
would “be the greatest Watergate casualty of all” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6).  Quickly returning to 
his optimistic attitude, however, Senator Baker offered his suggestion that “Watergate may prove 
to be a great national opportunity to revitalize the political process and to involve even more 
Americans in the day-to-day work of our two great political parties” if the probe into it leads to 
“a new and better way of doing political business” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6).  Senator Baker also 
added that he was “deeply encouraged by the fact” that officials from neither party’s committee 
“played any role in” the Watergate affair (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6). 
 The next portion of Senator Baker’s opening statement is exceptionally relevant to the 
purpose of this thesis and speaks for itself: 
With these thoughts in mind, I intend to pursue, as I know each member of this 
committee intends to pursue, an objective and even-handed but thorough, 
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complete, and energetic inquiry into the facts.  We will inquire into every fact and 
follow every lead, unrestrained by any fear of where that lead might ultimately 
take us.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6) 
 Senator Baker, in his kind Tennessee manner, then ended his opening statement with a 
round of thanks and set the tone for the hearings by proclaiming that the committee “is fully 
prepared to proceed with the business of discovering the facts” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6).  My 
overall impression of Senator Baker’s opening statement is that he, in the face of a difficult 
situation, elected to forego pessimism and instead opted for optimism, all the while making clear 
than he was out to find the truth – not to protect the President.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
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Nixon:   “[H]e’s [Senator Howard Baker] not handled himself well, and he doesn’t realize that he’s just 
going to make himself a hero for a while and he will destroy forever his chances to move up in his 
party”. 
- 3/16/1973 CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT H. R. HALDEMAN (KUTLER, 1997, PP. X & 233) 
 
SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF PAUL LEEPER 
 
 
 
At the time of his witness testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, Paul Leeper was a sergeant with the Metropolitan Police Department of 
Washington, D.C. (“Hearings”, 1973).  Leeper’s testimony took place on the first day of the 
public hearings – Thursday, May 17, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973).  He was the third of four 
witnesses to provide his testimony to the committee on that first day (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker began his questioning of Sergeant Paul Leeper by inquiring into the details 
surrounding a man who had watched the officers as they searched a terrace of the Watergate 
complex from a balcony of a Howard Johnson motel room opposite the Watergate complex just 
prior to the arrest (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker asked Leeper as to the whereabouts of the 
man, the length of time the man spent watching the officers, and the man’s name (“Hearings”, 
1973).  The man’s name, as it turned out, was James Baldwin; Mr. Baldwin’s testimony will be 
examined later (“Hearings”, 1973). 
In Senator Baker’s main round of questioning, he focused on two key topics – Leeper’s 
overtime shift he was working during the course of the Watergate break-in and, once again, 
James Baldwin (“Hearings”, 1973).  Specifically, Senator Baker asked Leeper why he was 
working beyond his normal shift, to which Leeper replied that they “have quite a few burglaries” 
take place in the office buildings they patrol in the area and that they “work over quite a bit” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 109).  Regarding Baldwin, Senator Baker asked Leeper who actually saw 
Baldwin and what Baldwin did (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker expressed to Senator Ervin 
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his interest in having Carl Shoffler, the officer who joined Leeper on the terrace and actually 
spotted Baldwin, called to testify before the committee (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker 
continued, “I would like to hear his [Shoffler’s] firsthand testimony in that respect” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 110).  Senator Baker later focused on whether the arrested Watergate burglars spoke to 
anyone besides the pair of lawyers who showed up at the jail the morning of the arrest; Leeper 
responded in the negative (“Hearings”, 1973).  Throughout his questioning of Leeper, Senator 
Baker’s main focus seemed to be on the lookout for the burglars, James Baldwin (“Hearings”, 
1973).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
` 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Nixon:   “Well, you might have a little fun with some of the Senators in a quiet way.” 
Colson:   “I might talk to a few this weekend.  I’ll also see what Baker is sniffing around on.” 
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- 3/16/1973 CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL AIDE CHARLES COLSON (KUTLER, 1997, PP. X & 240) 
 
SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF CARL SHOFFLER 
 
 
 
Carl Shoffler, at the time of his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, was an officer for the Metropolitan Police Department of 
Washington, D.C. (“Hearings”, 1973).  Shoffler’s testimony took place on the second day of the 
public hearings – Friday, May 18, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973).  He was the first of two witnesses to 
appear before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities that day 
(“Hearings”, 1973).   
In his main round of questioning, Senator Baker addressed five main topics with Officer 
Shoffler:  (1) the taping of the doors which allowed the Watergate burglars access to rooms that 
appeared locked, the discovery of which by an externally hired security guard for the Watergate 
complex hinted at potential larceny; (2) the examination of the terrace by Shoffler and Leeper; 
(3) the arrival of additional police to the Watergate complex; (4) the arrest of the burglars; and 
(5) Frank Wills, the aforementioned security guard (“Hearings”, 1973).  About halfway through 
his round of questioning, Senator Baker “short circuit[ed] the inquiry” via summarizing the facts 
as he understood them (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 122).  He wrapped up his list of facts by requesting 
Shoffler to confirm “[i]f all those things are so”, to which Shoffler replied in the affirmative 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 122).   
Senator Baker then, in response to what he viewed as an unfair question asked by Dash 
about a disconnect between the testimonies of Shoffler and Leeper regarding the taping of the 
doors, spoke up before Shoffler was able to respond to Dash’s question: 
  All right, now, Mr. Chairman, just a second. 
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You know, we are not in a court of law.  We don’t proceed by evidentiary rules, 
but the witness testified yesterday very clearly in one respect and this witness has 
testified very clearly today.  I think we ought not to try to lead the witness into a 
different statement.  I think both statements stand on their own merit and we 
ought to leave it there.  (“Hearings”, 1973, pp. 123-124) 
While Senator Baker clearly believed that each witness should be able to deliver his or 
her own testimony without interference, Senator Ervin sided with Dash and allowed the question 
by saying, “I see no harm in the question” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 124).  Senator Baker’s objection 
to Dash’s question, however, exemplified that Senator Baker was willing to stand up to the 
Democratic majority (“Hearings”, 1973).  The exchange also clearly exemplified that Senator 
Baker was attempting to get all the details possible out of each witness while trying to limit 
anything that would alter their testimonies.  In his questioning of Shoffler, Senator Baker again 
strove to uncover a great deal of facts, as exemplified by his five areas of inquiry in his first 
round of questioning, but he also instigated a public disagreement with the majority counsel 
(“Hearings”, 1973).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Kleindienst:  “And I said, Howard, you’re not being bugged. [Laughter.]” 
Nixon:  “Why of course not.” 
- 3/22/1973 CONVERSATION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD KLEINDIENST (KUTLER, 1997, PP. XI & 259-260) 
 
SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF JAMES MCCORD, JR. 
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James McCord first joined the Committee To Re-Elect the President in September 1971 
as a part-time security consultant (“Hearings”, 1973).  In January 1972, he was named the full-
time security chief (“Hearings”, 1973).  In May and June 1972, McCord participated in two 
separate break-ins into the Democratic National Committee headquarters located within the 
Watergate complex, the second of which resulted in his arrest (“Hearings”, 1973).  At the time of 
his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, James 
McCord stood “convicted on a multicount Federal indictment charging burglary, electronic 
surveillance and conspiracy arising out of the break-in” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 125).  McCord’s 
testimony took place on the second and third days of the public hearings – Friday, May 18 and 
Tuesday, May 22, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973).  He was the final of two witnesses to appear before 
the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities on Friday and began the 
hearings on Tuesday (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker intervened during Dash’s initial questioning of McCord to request McCord 
to distinguish between the sources from which he received his information, “[I]t would be 
helpful to me and I believe to the committee, if in each instance when the information you give 
us not of your own personal first-hand knowledge, you identify it as such and give us the source”  
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 129).  Senator Ervin submitted his own take on the matter, “We will 
adhere as much as possible to the rules of evidence which have been established and used in all 
the courts” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 129).  Senator Baker, displaying unity of leadership, then 
remarked, “I thoroughly agree with the statement made by the chairman, I associate myself with 
him as to its content and form” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 129).  
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Senator Baker later asked McCord about the status of John Caulfield, whom McCord said 
had applied “[p]olitical pressure from the White House” on him “to remain silent” and “take 
Executive clemency by going off to prison quietly” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 132).  Dash replied to 
Senator Baker, “Mr. Caulfield is under subpoena and will be brought right after this witness” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 132).  Senator Baker, clearly unsatisfied with Dash’s answer, asked, “Is he 
under subpoena at the present time?”, to which Dash answered, “His counsel has been informed 
that he wants to testify and he will accept a subpoena” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 132).  In another 
instance of a Baker and Dash clash, Senator Baker dryly replied, “The answer is that he is not 
under subpoena” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 132). 
Soon thereafter, Senator Baker reiterated his desire for McCord to notify the committee 
when providing hearsay evidence, “[W]ould you identify as you go along those things attributed 
to other people that you do not know at firsthand?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 133).  After asking yet 
again, Senator Baker explained:  “I am not trying to exclude it [McCord’s hearsay evidence].  I 
wish simply to identify it as we go along” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 134). 
Senator Baker then discussed the purpose of his questioning, “I will try to confine my 
questions to an elaboration of those subjects that you have already covered, for the sake of 
developing either further information or a clearer understanding of those things that have already 
been touched” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 155).  Senator Baker then proceeded to summarize 
McCord’s testimony up to that point for clarification purposes (“Hearings”, 1973).   
A slight slip-up from Senator Baker then provided a moment of levity:  “Could we start at 
the beginning, Mr. Hunt–and tell us what your job was with the CIA–I mean, Mr. McCord” . . . 
“I don’t know who I am sorry to but I am sorry” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 155).  The pair then 
discussed McCord’s, not Hunt’s, job at the CIA (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker was then 
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interested in learning of McCord’s level of understanding of “electronic surveillance techniques 
and clandestine operations such as that which was conducted at the Watergate” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 156).  McCord replied, “I learned some electronics from the FBI” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
156).  In response to a question pertaining to the number of times McCord had broken into the 
Democratic National Committee, McCord answered that he had done so on two separate 
occasions (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker then got into the details of the break-ins (“Hearings”, 1973).  For the first 
break-in, he wanted to know the date, the members of the break-in group, what exactly they did, 
McCord’s specific instructions, and information about the taping of doors (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Senator Baker wanted to know, for the most part, the same information about the second break-
in into the Democratic National Committee; specifically, he wanted to ascertain the purpose of 
the break-in, the members of this break-in group, what exactly they did, and information about 
the taping of doors (“Hearings”, 1973).  
The next topic of discussion was McCord’s employment of Baldwin (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Senator Baker then asked McCord about any other clandestine activities he might have been 
involved in, “[D]id you ever conduct electronic surveillance or clandestine activities against 
anyone other than the DNC . . . and the McGovern headquarters which you have already 
described?”; McCord responded in the negative (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 159).   
Senator Baker then questioned McCord about his awareness of the illegality of and 
motivations for his actions (“Hearings”, 1973).  McCord told Senator Baker, “[O]ne of the basic 
motivations was the fact that . . . the Attorney General . . . approved it in his offices over a series 
of meetings in which he had obviously given careful consideration to it” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
159).  In a gripping close to his round of questioning, Senator Baker asked McCord whether he 
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had any evidence that demonstrated Mitchell’s role (“Hearings”, 1973).  McCord explained that 
because “the counsel to the President sat in with” Mitchell, he believed “the Attorney General 
himself had conveyed the decision to his own superior for final decision” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
160).  To wrap up the day, Senator Baker requested McCord to provide more information than 
only that which was asked of him (“Hearings”, 1973). 
The following Tuesday, Senator Baker started the questioning for the day and picked up 
right where he left off by reiterating his request of McCord to provide more information than 
only that which was asked of him (“Hearings”, 1973).  McCord replied, “I will try to give as 
much information as I can” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 192).  After McCord concluded his reading of 
lengthy prepared remarks, Senator Baker commented, “I am very grateful, I think you supplied a 
great deal of additional information and it raises a great number of new questions” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 202).  Senator Baker once again prefaced his round of questioning by summarizing what 
McCord had told the committee (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker then probed into McCord’s political motivations for the break-in 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  McCord replied, “I was fully aware that others had such motivations” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 203).  Senator Baker then asked, “Mr. McCord, speaking of electronic 
surveillance, do you know of or did you ever investigate the bugging of Republican headquarters 
of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President”? (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 203).  McCord 
responded in the affirmative (“Hearings”, 1973).  After McCord explained what he knew 
regarding the question, Senator Baker justified his question: 
Mr. McCord, I am not trying to create the impression that because there were 
apparently taps on the Republican phones, that that justifies taps on the 
Democratic phones.  I do not believe that, but I am anxious to know your state of 
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mind and the reason and rationale for your security operations, including the 
break-in into the Watergate.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 205) 
 The next topic of discussion was McCord’s employment at the Republican National 
Committee (“Hearings”, 1973).  The final topic for this round of questioning began with Senator 
Baker asking, “You recognize the term Gemstone?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 206).  McCord 
responded that he had, in fact, heard of it (“Hearings”, 1973).  He said, “That term I . . . first read 
about in the newspaper” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 206).  Senator Baker cordially concluded his 
round of questioning:  “Thank you very much, Mr. McCord.  I am very grateful.  I think you 
responded in a very thorough and very eloquent way to the question I put on Friday and I am 
very grateful to you” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 206). 
Even before launching into his own round of questioning, Senator Baker was keen in 
requesting McCord to make distinctions between first-hand and hearsay evidence (“Hearings”, 
1973).  I believe this was in order to allow for better judgment of the information McCord was 
providing to the committee (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker, throughout the course of his 
interrogation of McCord, was focused on further developing McCord’s testimony regarding the 
break-in (“Hearings”, 1973).  He also probed into the mind of McCord by asking him about his 
rational for participating in the break-in (“Hearings”, 1973). 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Nixon: “I think you’ve really got to be the Baker hand-holder, if you will.  It’s a hell of a tough job, but if 
you have to have him move in with you, why do it.” 
Kleindienst: “I’ll babysit the sumbitch 24 hours a day.” 
Nixon: “That’s right.  Get his wife out of the way and keep him in.” 
. . .  
Nixon: “Then let’s leave it this way.  You’ll handle Baker now, you’ll babysit him starting like in about 
ten minutes?” 
Kleindienst: “Just like he’s a brother.” 
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 - 3/22/1973 CONVERSATION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD KLEINDIENST (CONT.) (KUTLER, 1997, PP. XI & 259-
260) 
 
SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF BERNARD BARKER 
 
 
 
Bernard Barker also took part in both break-ins into the Democratic National Committee 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  At the time of his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, Bernard Barker stood convicted for his part in the Watergate 
break-in of June 17, 1972 (“Hearings”, 1973).  Barker’s testimony took place on the fifth day of 
the public hearings – Thursday, May 24, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973).  He was the second of three 
witnesses to appear before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities that 
day (“Hearings”, 1973).   
 Senator Baker’s only round of questioning during Bernard Barker’s testimony began with 
an examination into Barker’s background, which naturally lent itself to the following question:    
“Mr. Barker, what on earth would motivate you at your station in life, at your age, and with that 
background, to do something that surely you knew to be illegal?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 365).  
Barker explained that his role extended beyond just Watergate: 
[I]t started out with Ellsberg, then it came to Hoover, then we came up for these 
operations which involved not only the break-in at the Democratic national 
headquarters, but I supposed, the same type of a mission into the McGovern 
headquarters  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 366). 
Regarding his motivation to participate in such activities, Barker said, “[W]e were assisting Mr. 
Hunt” and “had hopes that Mr. Hunt’s position in the White House would be a decisive factor at 
a later date for obtaining help in the liberation of Cuba” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 366-367). 
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 When Senator Baker asked Barker when he arrived at his decision to enter a guilty plea, 
Barker responded, “[I]t was after the Dolphins-Redskins game” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 367).  
Senator Baker comically responded with, “Do you remember the score, Mr. Barker?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 367).  Barker, in fact, did, “Thirteen to seven” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 367).  
Reestablishing seriousness, Senator Baker asked:  “Mr. Barker, what part did you play in the 
break-in of the Watergate complex, the Democratic national headquarters on June 17?  What was 
your assignment and responsibility?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 367).  Barker responded, “[M]y 
principal assignment was the location of documents” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 367).   
The next and final topic of discussion was “the taping of the doors” during the Watergate 
break-ins (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 367).  Senator Baker specifically asked Barker about the decision 
to re-enter after the tape had been discovered during the second Watergate break-in:  “Were you 
apprehensive, knowing that the doors had been taped and some unknown person not of your 
group had removed the tape?  Were you apprehensive about continuing with the burglary?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 368).  Barker replied, “I was against entry at that time, and to the best of 
my recollection, so was Mr. Hunt, my superior” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 368).  Senator Baker 
wanted to know who then made the decision to re-enter (“Hearings”, 1973).  Barker replied, “I 
have no knowledge” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 368).  Senator Baker’s questioning of Bernard Barker, 
while only consisting of a single round of questioning, was one of Senator Baker’s more 
entertaining interrogations (“Hearings”, 1973).  His main theme was Barker’s motivation for 
doing what he did (“Hearings”, 1973). 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
Haldeman:   “And what he said to the Vice President–the Vice President called me and what he said is that he 
has a firm conviction–Howard does now–that our stand on executive privilege is very unwise in a 
public relations sense”. 
- 3/29/1973 CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT H. R. HALDEMAN (KUTLER, 1997, PP. X &282– 
283) 
 
SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF ALFRED BALDWIN III 
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Alfred Baldwin, a former FBI agent, was contacted on May 1, 1972, by James McCord 
regarding possible employment (“Hearings”, 1973).  McCord told Baldwin that the job “would 
involve security work for the Committee To Re-Elect the President” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 391).  
After taking the job, Baldwin “was instructed to monitor all telephone conversations that were 
being received over . . . units that were in the Howard Johnson room and to make a log of all 
units” (“Hearings”, 1973 p. 400).  Baldwin was later instructed by McCord just before the 
second Watergate break-in to serve as a lookout (“Hearings”, 1973).  Baldwin’s testimony took 
place on the fifth day of the public hearings – Thursday, May 24, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973).  He 
was the final of three witnesses to appear before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities that day (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker, after Alfred Baldwin’s opening statement, asked Baldwin to clarify the 
mention Baldwin had made towards the end of his statement of a promise (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Baldwin replied that he was referring to “the promise of the U.S. attorneys that if I cooperated I 
would be a witness and not a defendant” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 390).  Senator Baker then 
defiantly responded, “Well, I just want it clearly understood that no promise by the U.S. attorney 
is binding on this member of the committee” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 391).  Baker then suggested 
that the committee defer to Senator Weicker for the initial interrogation of Baldwin (“Hearings”, 
1973).  He said, “Senator Weicker has had an opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to interview this 
witness on one or more occasion” and “is from Connecticut” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 391).  
Senator Ervin agreed with Senator Baker (“Hearings”, 1973). 
Early in his brief round of questioning, Senator Baker was interested in learning whom 
Baldwin communicated with via walkie-talkie during the Watergate break-in:  
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On the night in question, or, rather, the morning of June 17, 1972, when you were 
standing on the balcony of Howard Johnson’s, you testified that you saw the 
lights come on on the eighth floor, you saw two men on the balcony of the sixth 
floor, you called on your walkie-talkie on the second occasion and said, are your 
men dressed casually?  Someone replied, no, they are dressed in business suits.  
Did you know whom you were talking to?  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 411) 
Baldwin responded, “No, I did not, Senator” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 411).  Senator Baker 
wrapped up his questioning of Baldwin by focusing on whether Baldwin knew the arresting 
officers (“Hearings”, 1973).  Baldwin responded:  “I did not at the time.  I do now” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 412).  Senator Baker, throughout Baldwin’s testimony, emphasized the independence of 
the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (“Hearings”, 1973).  During 
his brief questioning of Baldwin, Senator Baker was interested in Baldwin’s communication with 
the break-in team and in any possible relationship Baldwin had with the arresting officers 
(“Hearings”, 1973). 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
Ehrlichman:  “Baker was a lot of help–in fact, Baker was of enormous help all through this thing today. . . . The 
rules of evidence–we’re going to try and draft some exclusionary rules of evidence that will keep 
hearsay out and will keep out the thing that Bob was concerned about, about conduit people 
testifying to things that were told to them.” . . .  
Nixon:  . . . “Did Baker help you any on [Dean]?” 
Ehrlichman: “No, Baker did not help me.  He feels Dean should come.  And so he and Ervin ganged up on me 
on that one.” 
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 - 4/9/1973 CONVERSATION WITH COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHAIR OF THE DOMESTIC COUNCIL JOHN D. 
EHRLICHMAN (KUTLER, 1997, PP. X & 299) 
 
SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF JOHN DEAN 
 
 
 
At the time of his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, John W. Dean, III had formerly served as President Nixon’s counsel 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  Dean’s testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities occupied the entire workweek from Monday, June 25 to Friday, June 29, 
1973 (“Hearings”, 1973).  He was the only witness to appear before the committee that week 
(“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker opened his questioning of John Dean on June 28 in commendatory fashion 
by describing Dean as “a very patient witness, and very thorough” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1465).  
Prior to beginning his questioning, Senator Baker informed Dean that the purpose of his 
questioning would be to provide structure “so that we have a coherent presentation against which 
we can measure the testimony of other witnesses” and “against whatever other information the 
committee can gather” (“Hearings”, 1973, pp. 1465-1466).  Senator Baker then memorably set 
forth “the central question” for which he was expecting Dean’s assistance:  “What did the 
President know and when did he know it?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1466).  This question would 
serve as the underlying foundation for Senator Baker’s questioning of Dean (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Senator Baker also stated his desire to divide evidence stemming from Dean’s testimony into 
three separate categories:  (1) direct, (2) circumstantial, and (3) hearsay (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Senator Baker then closed his introductory remarks with still more praise, calling Dean “a very 
remarkable witness” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1466). 
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Senator Baker began his questioning by seeking to discover “what the President knew” 
about the June 17, 1972, Watergate break-in prior to its occurrence (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1467).  
Dean provided no assistance in this regard (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker then moved on to 
the question of, “What did the President know and when did he know it about the coverup”? 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1467).  The vast majority of the remainder of Baker’s questioning of Dean 
would be devoted to answering this very question (“Hearings”, 1973).  Dean initially informed 
Senator Baker that the starting point for answering this question would be his September 15, 
1972, meeting with President Nixon (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Before delving into that particular meeting, however, a couple of other items were 
addressed (“Hearings”, 1973).  First of all, Senator Baker wanted to make it perfectly clear that 
the overall purpose for his questionings was not “to defend or prosecute the President or any 
witness” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1469).  The other items that were addressed were a draft of a 
September 1972 memo created by a man named Kenneth Parkinson, at the request of John Dean, 
and the finalized version of that memo which ultimately found its way to President Nixon 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker, focusing on his fundamental question, asked Dean, “What in 
this exhibit sheds any further light or implies any further information about the scope and extent, 
if any, of the President’s knowledge of the coverup”? (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1472).  Dean replied 
to Senator Baker that he viewed the cover-up as a broad area of inquiry (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Senator Baker then found it necessary to narrow the term cover-up to “the apparent efforts to 
conceal the connection with and responsibility for the unlawful entry into the Democratic 
National Headquarters at the Watergate complex on the morning of June 17, 1972” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 1472).  The memo ultimately did not provide additional insight into the President’s 
knowledge of the newly defined cover-up (“Hearings”, 1973).  It did, however, “shed some light 
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on at least the willingness to commence counteractions to avoid further prying into the situation 
at the White House” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1473).  The pair then delved into Dean’s September 
15, 1972, meeting with the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  Also present at this meeting was H. R. 
Haldeman (“Hearings”, 1973).  The significant finding in relation to Senator Baker’s ultimate 
purpose was that the meeting led Dean to believe “that the President knew that there was an on-
going counter-effort” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1481).   
Before getting into a discussion about any subsequent meetings between Dean and the 
President, Senator Baker and Dean discussed a few documents (“Hearings”, 1973).  The first two 
documents related to Senator Baker’s aforementioned meeting with the President (“Hearings”, 
1973).  The first of these documents was an agenda created by Dean, at the request of H. R. 
Haldeman, for Dean’s February 27, 1973, meeting with President Nixon (“Hearings”, 1973).  
The agenda included the item “Baker meeting with President” and suggested that Senator Baker 
“wants to help” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1485).  The second document was another agenda – this 
time for Senator Baker’s meeting with the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  Items on this agenda 
included:  “Take Baker’s pulse and find out how much he wants to help” and “Baker can be 
assured that no one in the White House had any knowledge that there was going to be a break-in 
and bugging of the DNC” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1486).  Dean then said that he later learned that 
the main topic of Senator Baker’s meeting with the President was Senator Baker’s desire for the 
President to waive his executive privilege (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Dean then stated that “[t]he next significant document leading up to my meetings . . . was 
a request again by Mr. Haldeman” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1488).  The document was a memo 
pertaining to a meeting with the Attorney General (“Hearings”, 1973).  Before getting into the 
details of this memo, however, Senator Baker departed for a rollcall vote (“Hearings”, 1973).  
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Upon his return and after questioning by Senator Talmadge, Senator Baker and John Dean 
resumed their discussion of the memo (“Hearings”, 1973).  The final topic discussed by Senator 
Baker and Dean that Thursday was Dean’s February 27, 1973, meeting with the President 
(“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker resumed his questioning of Dean the following day by reminding Dean 
that his “primary thesis is still what did the President know, and when did he know it?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1537).  Senator Baker informed Dean that the plan for the day was to limit 
discussion “to the remaining meetings that we did not cover and to direct information only” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1537).  The first meeting the two covered that day was Dean’s March 13, 
1973, meeting with the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  Dean, in that meeting, which was also 
attended by Haldeman, informed the President “that the individuals who had either been 
convicted or pleaded guilty were continuing to make their demands of the White House” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1539).  Dean then painted a picture of the President’s seemingly damning 
response: 
The President asked me, “Well, how much are they demanding and how much is 
it going to cost?”  And I said, “Well, to the best of my estimation it will cost a 
million dollars or more to continue the payments.”  At that point, the President, I 
can recall this very vividly, leaned back in his chair and he sort of slid his chair 
back from the desk and he said to me that a million dollars was no problem at all.  
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1539) 
The next meeting that Senator Baker and Dean covered was Dean’s meeting with 
President Nixon on the morning of March 21, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973).  This was the infamous 
meeting during which Dean told President Nixon “that there was a cancer growing on the 
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Presidency” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1541).  Dean informed Senator Baker that Nixon’s response 
“indicated that the President still did not realize the implications of this matter” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 1544).  Senator Baker and Dean then moved on to the meeting between Dean and the 
President later that same day (“Hearings”, 1973).  Dean said that he “was very upset at what had 
occurred that morning” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1546).  It was in that meeting, which also included 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman, that Dean told the President, “I think that Mr. Haldeman, Mr. 
Ehrlichman, and myself are indictable” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1547).   
The next meeting that was addressed by Senator Baker and Dean occurred the following 
day – March 22, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973).  Also present at this meeting were Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and Mitchell (“Hearings”, 1973).  During this meeting, Dean insisted that “[t]here 
was nothing dramatic that happened” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1549).  The next topic of discussion 
was Dean’s phone conversation with the President the following day (“Hearings”, 1973).  
According to Dean, the highlight of the call occurred when the President said, “Well, John, your 
prediction is correct”, referring to Dean’s statement to the President of two days prior that “not 
all the defendants would remain silent” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1550).  That very day, McCord had 
broken his silence as he “submitted his letter to the court” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1550).   
The final meeting that was discussed in-depth was Dean’s April 15, 1973, meeting with 
the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  It was during this meeting that Dean informed President 
Nixon that he “had been to the prosecutors” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1553).  According to Dean, “I 
told him I did not believe this was an act of disloyalty, I felt I had to go and do it” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 1553).  Referring back to Dean’s March 13 meeting with the President, Dean informed 
Senator Baker that: 
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It was toward the end of the conversation that he raised on his own and asked me 
if I remembered when he had mentioned the fact that it would not be any problem 
to pay $1 million and I said, “Yes, I recall that conversation.”  He said, “Well, of 
course, I was joking, I was only joking when I said that.”  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
1555) 
Dean also mentioned that the President later whispered to him, “I was foolish to talk with Colson 
about Executive clemency for Hunt, was I not?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1555). 
 Senator Baker wrapped up his round of questioning by addressing two topics:  (1) gaining 
access to the President and (2) a letter from Congressman Garry Brown (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Regarding the former, Senator Baker stated, “So as we say in Tennessee, there are lots of ways to 
skin a cat and I wouldn’t presume to say how we go about it” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1557).  In 
regards to the latter, Senator Baker said, “Congressman Garry Brown has written a letter to this 
committee that refers directly to certain statements made by Mr. Dean” and asked “that the letter 
be included in the record” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1557).   
 Later in the day, Senator Baker read a letter from Senator Strom Thurmond (“Hearings”, 
1973).  The letter opened with: 
Earlier testimony in today’s hearing carried the impression that a friend of mine, 
Mr. Harry Dent of South Carolina, might have done something improper.  I would 
greatly appreciate it if one of you gentlemen would set the record straight before 
today’s hearings are completed.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1563) 
 In a subsequent interjection, Senator Baker sought to clarify the classification of an 
exhibit (“Hearings”, 1973).  The exhibit in question consisted of “the transcribed notes of a 
telephone conversation between Mr. Buzhardt, an attorney of the White House, and Mr. 
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Thompson, which were turned over to Mr. Dash and reviewed subsequently by Mr. Garment and 
Mr. Buzhardt” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1569).  Senator Baker “caution[ed] against . . . taking that 
as a statement of a White House position or a Presidential statement at this time” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 1569).  Senator Baker concluded his overall questioning of Dean by reading aloud the 
aforementioned letter from Congressman Garry Brown in case “Mr. Dean would want to 
comment on it before he makes his closing statement” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1597). 
 The overall theme of Senator Baker’s questioning of John Dean unmistakably was, 
“What did the President know and when did he know it?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1466).  Traits of 
Senator Baker that are apparent from his questioning of Dean are his polite nature, his organized 
progression through his questioning, and his fairness in allowing for a defense mechanism for 
those cast in a negative light by Dean’s testimony (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker, 
throughout his questioning of Dean, upheld his opening statement promise to engage in “an 
objective and even-handed but thorough, complete, and energetic inquiry into the facts” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
 
Ehrlichman:  “Baker swears by this minority counsel of his.  This fellow Thompson and–” 
Nixon:  “Says he’s tough–” 
Ehrlichman: “Says he’s good and tough, a lot of experience and so forth.” 
 - 4/10/1973 CONVERSATION WITH COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHAIR OF THE DOMESTIC COUNCIL JOHN D. 
EHRLICHMAN (KUTLER, 1997, PP. X & 302) 
 
SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF JOHN MITCHELL 
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John N. Mitchell, at the time of his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, had formerly served as the U.S. Attorney General and the 
campaign director for the Committee To Re-Elect the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  Mitchell’s 
testimony was completed in the three-day span from Tuesday, July 10 to Thursday, July 12, 1973 
(“Hearings”, 1973). 
Senator Baker began his questioning of John Mitchell by describing Mitchell’s testimony 
up to that point as “significant in many respects” in that it had both provided “new insight into 
important new material” and brought about “apparent conflicts with the testimony of other 
witnesses” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1829).  Senator Baker, much as he did throughout his 
questioning of Dean, relied on a fundamental line of questioning with Mitchell (“Hearings”, 
1973).  The question once again focused on the President and was presented to Mitchell as, 
“[W]hat is your perception of the obligations of the Presidency and your obligations to it?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1830).  In providing an example of what he was looking for in response, 
Senator Baker came off as poetic: 
Is the Presidency so shrouded in mystique, is there such as aura of magnificence 
about the Presidency, is there such an awesome responsibility for a multitude of 
problems and undertakings of this Nation that the Presidency in some instances 
must be spared the detail, must be spared the difficult situations which in more 
ordinary circumstances might be considered by some at least to be frank, open, 
declarations of criminal offense?  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1831) 
 Mitchell responded that he withheld the White House horror stories from the President, 
because it would have resulted in the President having “a choice of being involved in what you 
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all referred to as a coverup or he would be involved in the disclosures which would affect his 
reelection” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1831).  Senator Baker then asked Mitchell to provide an 
example, “Is there any other important decision that you can think of that the President ought to 
be spared from making?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1832).  Mitchell replied, “I think as your 
hearings go on, you will find out about other ones” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1832).   
Senator Baker then delved into the implications of Mitchell’s way of thinking, “Do you 
not, in fact, by that, arrogate unto yourself a Presidential decision?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1833).  
After an affirmative response from Mitchell, Senator Baker asked Mitchell, “How do we go 
about making sure that Presidential-level decisions, decisions of tremendous importance, are in 
fact made by the President and not by someone else?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1833).  Mitchell 
managed to scoot around this question by stating that things of this nature happen all the time 
(“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker then shifted the focus from a general discussion of the office of the 
Presidency to a specific discussion of President Nixon, “What is there in your perception of the 
man that would contribute or did contribute to your decision not to tell him about this?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1834).  Mitchell then basically repeated that President Nixon would have 
publicly revealed the damaging information, thus hurting his reelection chances, to which 
Senator Baker responded, “I am inclined to think you are right” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1834).  
Baker then pointed out something that seemed suspicious to him:   
But I rather think that your hindsight is remarkable; that you at that time, when 
you yourself, according to your testimony, were completely free of any 
involvement in the so-called White House horrors, in the break-in incident on 
June 17, 1972, and certainly free of any allegations in connection with the 
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coverup, the payoff, and the like.  At that point in time, in mid-June 1972, you 
made a decision not to tell the President because you were afraid he would fire 
those involved.  Even if you do not think of it from any circumstance except how 
it affected you, did that not (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1834). 
At that point, Mitchell cut off Baker and explained that it was not the potential firings 
that were of concern to him; it was “the unraveling of some of these activities that existed over 
there” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1834).  Mitchell informed Baker, “[I]t was not the break-in at the 
Watergate that was the concern”; instead, it was the White House horror stories – “the Ellsberg 
matter, the Diem papers, the Dita Beard matter, the stories of surreptitious and unauthorized 
wiretapping, the bombing of the Brookings Institute, et cetera” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1835).  
Senator Baker, nevertheless, brought the conversation right back to Watergate (“Hearings”, 
1973).  
Senator Baker then eased a tense moment with a short anecdote: 
I introduced you at the [Tennessee Bar Association] reception to some of my 
friends who are attorneys in Tennessee.  I said, Mr. Mitchell, as you know, was 
once President Nixon’s law partner.  And our distinguished witness said, no, Mr. 
Nixon was my law partner.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1836) 
Baker continued:  “Now, Mr. Mitchell, I have no quarrel with you.  I welcome this 
opportunity to find out where the threshold is, where the crossover point is on the importance of 
an event versus the responsibility to tell the President” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1836).  This portion 
of the questioning concluded with Mitchell agreeing with Senator Baker that the administration 
should have been more open, “[I]t might even have been better, Senator, as you say, take them 
out on the White House lawn” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1837). 
TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS Borns 44
Senator Baker wrapped up his questioning of Mitchell by asking for suggestions on 
gaining access to the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  Ironically, the lights shut off in the middle of 
his questioning on this topic; Senator Baker commented, “It is not significant, I hope, that at that 
point the lights went out” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1838).  Baker’s humorous tone quickly turned 
weary as he seemed stumped on how to get access to the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  He did, 
however, bring up the “precedent established in 1919 when the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee asked President Woodrow Wilson to appear in connection with ratification of the 
Treaty of Versailles and President Wilson . . . invited the Foreign Relations Committee to the 
White House” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1839).  Mitchell concluded the discussion by suggesting 
that Senator Baker “and the chairman go down and discuss it with” the President (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 1839). 
In his questioning of John Mitchell, Senator Baker once again stuck to a line of 
questioning focusing on the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  While Mitchell seemed to want to 
draw the attention away from the Watergate break-in, Senator Baker did not relent (“Hearings”, 
1973).  Baker also maintained his charm in a tense moment and made clear his desire to get first-
hand information from the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker’s unrelenting desire to 
hear directly from President Nixon falls in line with his opening statement promise to “inquire 
into every fact and follow every lead, unrestrained by any fear of where that lead might 
ultimately take us” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6). 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
Nixon:  “How’s Baker handling himself?” 
Haldeman: “Well, he hasn’t–since they’ve been in recess, he hasn’t been heard from really.” 
 - 6/2/1973 CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT H. R. HALDEMAN (KUTLER, 1997, PP. X & 564) 
 
SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF JOHN EHRLICHMAN 
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John Ehrlichman, at the time of his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, had formerly served as “chief domestic adviser to the 
President” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. III of vol. 6).  Ehrlichman’s testimony was completed in five 
sittings from Tuesday, July 24 until Monday, July 30, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973). 
Senator Baker opened his questioning of John Ehrlichman on Tuesday, July 24 with a 
compliment to Senator Ervin, who had just concluded his round of questioning:  “[Y]ou are the 
only man I ever saw who can read the transcript of a telephone conversation . . . and make it 
sound like the New Testament” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2579).  Senator Baker then proceeded to 
inform Ehrlichman as to his plan for his questioning – that he would focus on “a couple of 
fundamental considerations” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2579).  Senator Baker began by asking 
Ehrlichman if he had known of the impending Watergate break-in beforehand; Ehrlichman said 
that he had not (“Hearings”, 1973).   
In response to a follow-up question about precisely when Ehrlichman did learn of the 
break-in, Ehrlichman responded, “On the day following the break-in, when I received this 
telephone call toward dusk” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2580).  The call was from a man named Mr. 
Boggs, who worked for the Secret Service (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2580).  Ehrlichman said that 
Mr. Boggs told him that one of the men arrested “had in his possession the name of someone 
who apparently was a White House employee” – Howard Hunt (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2580).  
Senator Baker learned that Ehrlichman then “called Ron Ziegler, the press secretary, who was 
with the President in Florida, and told him about that telephone call” and “called Mr. Colson to 
find out whether Howard Hunt still was employed in the White House” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
2580).  Senator Baker also asked Ehrlichman what he learned about the break-in from 
newspapers (“Hearings”, 1973).   
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Senator Baker then asked Ehrlichman if he had any communication with various other 
White House officials on June 17; Ehrlichman said he had not (“Hearings”, 1973).  Baker then 
moved on to the next day, June 18 (“Hearings”, 1973).  Specifically, he asked Ehrlichman, “Who 
did you talk to, who talked to you, what additional information did you receive, and what action 
did you take?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2581).  Senator Baker and Ehrlichman then proceeded to 
discuss Ehrlichman’s June 18 telephone conversation with H. R. Haldeman, during which 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman “discussed the fact of the break-in, the fact of Hunt’s name being 
involved and McCord being involved, and so forth” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2581).  Ehrlichman 
then briefly touched on his meeting with John Dean the next day (“Hearings”, 1973).   
Senator Baker then voiced his surprise at the lack of White House concern over the 
situation: 
Mr. Ehrlichman, it occurs to me, and I may be entirely wrong, but it occurs to me 
that if someone on my staff, even remotely on my staff, were charged with 
breaking and entering into the Democratic National Committee headquarters or 
someone was even associated with it in a newspaper column, that I would be 
determined to find out if that happened. 
Now, was there this air of urgency in the White House on your part or 
Haldeman’s part or Dean’s part? . . . It sounds like a routine staff operation.  But 
this wasn’t a routine staff operation.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2582) 
Ehrlichman responded, “It was a dumb, shocking, unredeemable kind of thing for people 
connected with the Committee To Re-Elect to have done to the Democrats.  There isn’t any way 
of glossing it” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2582).   
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Senator Baker and Ehrlichman then discussed a meeting Ehrlichman had with John Dean, 
in which Dean informed Ehrlichman that “the Justice Department or the law enforcement people 
. . . were aware that this matter went beyond just the five fellows who were caught and that 
Liddy was involved . . . and that there was a further direct involvement of the CRP” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 2583).  Senator Baker then asked Ehrlichman:  “What did you do with that information?  
Did you pick up the telephone and call the President, did you call Haldeman?” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 2583).  Ehrlichman informed Senator Baker that he did not pass this information along 
to President Nixon (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker soon thereafter, consistent with his 
previous questioning, specifically asked Ehrlichman, “When did the President first know of CRP 
involvement in the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters?” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 2584)  Ehrlichman, however, was of little help in this regard (“Hearings”, 1973).   
The pair then moved on to a discussion of Ehrlichman’s June 20 meeting with President 
Nixon (“Hearings”, 1973).  As for the nature of the discussion surrounding Watergate in that 
meeting, Ehrlichman said, “[W]hat we really had for certain at that time was a kind of lingering 
concern because we did not know all the story” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2585).  Senator Baker then 
brought up the White House tape recording system, “Mr. Ehrlichman, do I understand that you 
did not know that tape recordings were being made of Presidential conversations at the White 
House during this period?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2585).  Ehrlichman assured Baker that he was 
unaware of the tape recording system (“Hearings”, 1973). 
Senator Baker then wrapped up his first round of questioning by summoning his famous 
line of questioning:  “[T]he question, what did the President know and when did he know, can be 
answered in part that he must have known on June 20 that certain major figures were involved?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2586).  After an affirmative response from Ehrlichman, Senator Baker 
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ended his questioning for that day by requesting Ehrlichman to contemplate over “what the 
President knew, if anything, prior to June 17” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2587). 
On Thursday, July 26, Senator Ervin read aloud a letter from President Nixon in which, 
according to Ervin, “[T]he President flatly refuses to give us the tapes that we identified in the 
subpoena as recording conversations between the President and John Dean” and “tells us he will 
furnish us the documents that he does not consider to be Presidential papers if we can identify 
the specific documents, which is an impossibility” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2658).  Senator Baker 
responds with, “[F]or those of us who are lawyers, and that is meant to be a term of approval 
rather than disapproval, I think the best way to summarize the present situation is to say thus, the 
issue was joined” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2659).  Baker emphasized the importance of this 
situation, “[T[he third branch of the Government now, the Judiciary, may, in fact, be called on to 
resolve a historic conflict between the remaining two branches” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2659). 
Senator Baker went on to restate his potential solution to the conundrum – “an informal 
panel of distinguished Americans not now holding a position in Government may review these 
tapes” and make recommendations based on their relevance (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2659).  He 
also submitted a new suggestion, which was a slight variation of his aforementioned proposal 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker even made the following motion: 
[T]hat counsel for the committee be authorized under the appropriate laws and 
statutes of the United States including the Declaratory Judgments Act to present a 
justifiable issue to the appropriate court based on the subpoena issued lawfully by 
this committee and on a letter declining the honoring of the subpoena, dated July 
25, 1973, signed by the President of the United States, and to take such steps as 
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may be necessary to present such issue for adjudication.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
2660–2661) 
The court, however, would end up dismissing this motion “for lack of jurisdiction and appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling” (“Senate”, p. 2). 
Senator Baker began his round of questioning that day by asking Ehrlichman about an 
August 1971 memo written to him from Bud Krogh and David Young (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Specifically, Senator Baker was interested in the missing fifth paragraph (“Hearings”, 1973).  He 
asked Ehrlichman, “What happened to paragraph 5, if you know and what did it say?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2702).  Ehrlichman informed Senator Baker that the missing paragraph 
“deals with an extremely sensitive subject relating to another country” and that he “would 
probably be violating two or three statutes if” he “disclosed at this point” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
2702–2703).  Senator Baker and Ehrlichman then discussed a different memo Ehrlichman 
received later in August 1971, this time solely from Young (“Hearings”, 1973).  According to 
Ehrlichman, this memo was meant to inform him “(1) [t]hat Daniel Ellsberg may not have been 
the man to turn the stuff over to the New York Times, and (2) there were a number of other 
people involved either in association with him or operating separately” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
2704).   
The conversation regarding this second memo led Senator Baker to explain, “What I do 
want to know is the breadth and range of your information as to that event or other security 
problems that may have had some bearing on the contentions of the President in his May 22 
statement” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2705).  Senator Baker had already addressed the portion of the 
President’s May 22, 1973, statement that he sought to examine, “Important national security 
operations which themselves had no connection with Watergate have become entangled in the 
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case” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2703).  Senator Baker learned that while President Nixon in his May 
22 statement named three separate “instance[s] of the activities of the Plumbers”, a fourth existed 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2706).  When Senator Baker asked Ehrlichman to reveal the fourth 
instance, Ehrlichman replied, “Under this letter I cannot, sir”, referring yet again to White House 
restrictions on discussing issues of national security concern (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2706).   
Senator Baker later addressed this concern over national security with the profound 
question, “How great must that national security issue be to take all the punishment that an 
administration and witnesses have taken?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2707).  Senator Baker then 
turned even more pointed, “What I am asking you is, is it that important or am I playing games?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2708).  Senator Baker later admitted to his rather active role in his 
questioning of Ehrlichman, “I have lectured you more than I have questioned you, but I think 
you understand the dimensions of my concern” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2709). 
After a suggestion from Ehrlichman’s attorney as to how the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities could garner access to the information they desired via “an 
executive session with the seven responsible Senators of this committee . . . with no one else”, 
Senator Baker replied, “I intend to take under advisement the whole thing and I will make an 
independent judgment on how I will proceed taking fully into account your very generous 
suggestion” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2710).  Senator Baker finished his round of questioning by 
providing the reasoning for delving so deeply into something that “has nothing to do or very 
likely has nothing to do with the Watergate break-in”: 
[I]t may or may not have something to do with a material allegation of the 
President in his May 22 statement.  If there is information available that validates 
it, it is important to know.  If there is information which tends to discredit it, we 
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sure need to know that, and I reserve the right to pursue that further, Mr. 
Chairman.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2710) 
On Monday, July 30, 1973, Senator Baker wrapped up Ehrlichman’s time on the stand,  
“You have given us a great volume of information and we thank you for it” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
2865).  With his questioning of Ehrlichman, Senator Baker unsurprisingly focused on the 
President (“Hearings”, 1973).  Specifically, Senator Baker was interested in the President’s 
knowledge of those involved in the Watergate break-in and in the validity of a national security 
claim made in a Presidential statement (“Hearings”, 1973).  He was also interested in learning 
about the White House atmosphere in the immediate aftermath of the break-in and emphasized 
the need for the committee to obtain access to information that potentially could, even 
tangentially, assist in finding answers to the questions surrounding the Watergate affair 
(“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker began with his familiar dose of humor, proceeded in an 
unreserved fashion, and closed with a sense of independence and civility (“Hearings”, 1973). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 11 
 
 
Nixon:   “I think you should call our friend Brother [Howard] Baker. . . . He’s put out a story as we were 
going out there on a plane that he made it a point, he made it a point, never to be alone with the 
President.  He was practically on us, all of us, with his camera, you know taking pictures and the 
rest of it.  For him to make such a point like that was utterly insulting.” 
Woods:  “Well, it was insulting.  What he’s trying to do is protect himself, from the other people saying 
he’s–” 
Nixon:  “Well yes. . . . [L]et me just say, we’re watching him closely because he’s not behaving well.” 
 - 6/19/1973 CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY ROSE MARY WOODS (KUTLER, 1997, PP. XII & 614) 
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SENATOR BAKER’S QUESTIONING OF H.R. HALDEMAN 
 
 
 
At the time of his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, H. R. Haldeman had formerly served “as the President’s chief of staff” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2871).  Haldeman’s testimony immediately followed that of Ehrlichman 
and stretched from Monday, July 30 until Wednesday, August 1, 1973 (“Hearings”, 1973). 
 Upon the conclusion of H. R. Haldeman’s opening statement to the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, John Wilson, Haldeman’s attorney, read aloud a 
letter sent to him by Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel to the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  The 
final paragraph of this letter read:   
If asked to testify as to facts which he [Haldeman] learned about meetings or 
portions of meetings which he did not attend, but of which he learned solely by 
listening to a tape recording of such meeting, the President has requested that you 
inform the Committee that Mr. Haldeman has been instructed by the President to 
decline to testify to such matters, and that the President, in so instructing Mr. 
Haldeman, is doing so pursuant to the constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2893) 
 Senator Ervin subsequently made known his view towards the letter and the request made 
there within, “[T]he matters which this committee is authorized by Senate Resolution No. 60 to 
investigate, are not covered by executive privilege of any kind” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2894). 
Senator Baker agreed, “[W]e will be better served by having the tapes themselves, but we are 
about to have litigation over that” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2894).  He continued, “So in the 
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meantime, I think, we have got to make do as best we can and I concur in the chairman’s ruling” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2894). 
 Senator Baker then inquired into the details surrounding Haldeman’s listening to two of 
the Nixon tapes (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker later made his thoughts known on the current 
state of the hearings: 
We have come a long way as a united committee, by and large free of at least the 
grosser forms of partisan political confrontation.  We have come a long way in 
terms of time, in terms of the expenditure of emotional traits and energy and 
resources.  As I said this morning, we are tired.  I have no apology for that, and I 
find that in attitudes and I am not being critical there.  I simply mean that we have 
got to get about the business of finishing these hearings.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
2905) 
He then once again complimented Senator Ervin “for very effective action in trying to establish 
and maintain decorum in this hearing room” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 2905).   
 The following day, Haldeman’s second day of testimony, Senator Baker pointed out the 
impropriety of the following comment made by Sam Dash to Haldeman:  “Please do not rest on a 
no or a yes answer.  You are giving me more of those than I got from Mr. Ehrlichman” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3044).  Senator Baker demurred, “[T]o say we get more yes or no answers 
from him than we did from Mr. Ehrlichman may not be significant to the record but it seems to 
me not particularly in assistance to our inquiry of this witness” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3044).   
 Senator Baker later focused on the necessity of the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities to acquire the tapes, “I can’t resist the temptation to find out all 
TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS Borns 55
we can find out” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3066).  Senator Ervin, using the President’s own words 
against him, then added the following to the discussion: 
I will give my interpretation of the letter the President wrote to me on July 23, 
1973, and I think he sustains our desire, the necessity of us having the tapes.  He 
says:   
However, as in any verbatim recording of informal conversations, they 
contain comments that persons with different perspectives and motivations 
would inevitably interpret in different ways.  
And since the President assures us that the committee might interpret the tapes in 
quite a different way from the way Mr. Haldeman has interpreted them, I am 
going to have to confess that I am going to be rather scrupulous in considering 
whether I accept Mr. Haldeman’s interpretation.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3066-
3067). 
Senator Baker, in yet another compliment to Senator Ervin, then approvingly remarked, “Mr. 
Chairman, I think what you have said is what I struggled to say” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3067). 
 Just after a rather heated exchange between Senator Ervin and Wilson, Senator Baker, at 
the outset of his next round of questioning, implored Senator Ervin, who had stated he was 
leaving to vote, to “wait just for a minute” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3086).  Baker continued, “I 
don’t want to take very much time on this but just as a preamble, Mr. Chairman, just as a 
preamble, nobody is mad, I trust” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 1973).   
Senator Baker then asked Haldeman about whether or not he had worked in conjunction 
with the White House on the preparation of his testimony; Haldeman assured Baker that he had 
not (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker then delved into the issue of executive privilege, calling 
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it “a legal principle that . . . has never before been really defined or determined by the highest 
court of the land” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3086).  He then inquired into Wilson’s contact with the 
White House before getting back to whether or not Haldeman worked with the White House on 
the preparation of his testimony (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker then put forth the following 
lengthy question to Haldeman: 
How in the world could you run such a tight ship and still on the morning of June 
17, 1972, have the papers emblazoned with the charge that 5 defendants, later 7, 
had been caught in the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the 
Watergate, followed on closely with the identification of one of them as the 
security officer of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, soon involving the 
general counsel for the Committee To Re-Elect the President, soon involving the 
transaction of funds, the number of other things that this record is burdened with 
now for many weeks; how could you run a tight ship and know all these things 
and not suspect that something was going on.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3088) 
Haldeman replied that he “knew something had gone on” but that he “didn’t know what” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3088).   
 Senator Baker then moved on to his core line of questioning: 
The one thing that keeps recurring to me, and the one thing I have tried to put to 
every witness who has unique information in addition to their own personal 
information and knowledge is, “What did the President know and when did he 
first know it?”  You were closer to the President of the United States more often 
than probably any other person in the world outside his immediate family.  
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3088) 
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Haldeman answered the question by revealing the nature of a September 12, 1972, 
meeting involving the President, the Cabinet, “some of the Republican leadership in the 
Congress, and the senior members of the White House staff” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3089).  
Haldeman said that in that meeting “the Attorney General of the United States spoke on the 
subject of the Watergate” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3089).   
 Senator Baker was then interested in discovering President Nixon’s reaction to learning 
about the involvement of Liddy and McCord in the Watergate affair (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Haldeman replied that Nixon’s consistent response to anything pertaining to the Watergate 
break-in was “utter incomprehension as to how such a thing could have happened and why such 
a thing would have happened” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3089).  The next topic of discussion was 
President Nixon’s use of executive privilege to withhold the tapes (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator 
Baker said, “I feel very strongly about this subject” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3090).  
 Senator Baker then sought to test the accuracy of Haldeman’s transcription of a portion of 
the tapes: 
[O]ne statement in your addendum . . . reads, “The President said there is no 
problem in raising $1 million.  We can do that but it would be wrong.” 
Now, if the period were to follow after “We can do that,” it would be a most 
damning statement.  If, in fact, the tapes clearly show he said “but it would be 
wrong,” it is an entirely different context.  Now, how sure are you, Mr. Haldeman, 
that those tapes, in fact say that?  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3090) 
Haldeman claimed that he was sure the President did add the trailing caveat (“Hearings”, 1973).   
 Senator Baker then inquired into whether or not other people would be allowed to listen 
to the tapes (“Hearings”, 1973).  Haldeman claimed that it was his “understanding that no one 
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would” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3090).  Wrapping up the discussion of the tapes and his round of 
questioning, Senator Baker asked, “Would you be agreeable, Mr. Haldeman, if it could be 
negotiated otherwise, to bringing those tapes up here, those two tapes and playing them?” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3091).  After speaking with Wilson, Haldeman answered, “I would 
welcome that opportunity because they would confirm what I have told you” (“Hearings”, 1973, 
p. 3091).  The early portions of Senator Baker’s next round of questioning dealt with financial 
concerns related to excess campaign funds from 1968, which went to such things as polling and 
advertising (“Hearings”, 1973).  The next topic centered around Mr. Ulasewicz’s employment 
(“Hearings”, 1973).   
 Senator Baker’s initial round of questioning the following day, Wednesday, August 1, 
Haldeman’s third and final day of testimony, began with questions surrounding surveillance of 
Senator Kennedy, “Mr. Haldeman, did you or did you not in June of 1972 arrange directly or 
through John Dean or anyone else for a 24-hour surveillance of Senator Kennedy?” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 3158).  Haldeman answered, “I don’t recall making such an arrangement” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 3158).   
 Senator Baker went on to ask Haldeman yet another lengthy question, which concluded 
with, “What is there about the institutional arrangement at the White House that would not 
inevitably lead you into a quick, urgent inquiry of what in the world happened down there, if 
nothing else on the basis of newspaper accounts?” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3160).  He later even 
provided a personal analogy to make the question even clearer: 
Had I in my campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1972 read in the Nashville 
newspapers that someone on my campaign staff had done thus and so and had 
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been arrested for it, it wouldn’t have been 30 seconds until I picked up the phone 
and would say what in the world is going on? . . .  
What I am asking is any insight you can give me on why a situation in Nashville, 
Tenn., is different from a situation that you might expect from the White House in 
Washington.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3161) 
Haldeman responded to Senator Baker’s question by saying that President Nixon had delegated 
the investigation into the Watergate situation (“Hearings”, 1973).  Senator Baker then asked 
Haldeman, “Do you think it could have been done otherwise?”; Haldeman replied that the 
President had other concerns to worry about (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3162).   
Later on in the morning, Senator Baker asked to be excused from the hearings for “the 
Federal aid to highways bill” that was “pending on the floor of the Senate” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
3171).  Senator Ervin humorously granted his request, “That is a very important bill and you 
have been a very interested member and after 75 or 80 conferences getting a compromise bill, 
and since your views on the bill are almost the same as mine, I will excuse you” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 3171). 
 Upon his return to the hearings, Senator Baker’s next round of questioning began with a 
clarification of his purpose, “I am not trying to lead you into the criticism of the staff 
arrangement, nor of the President, but rather simply to probe into the nature of things” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3183).  Senator Baker then posed a familiar inquiry, but this time in a 
slightly new light, “[W]hat is there about this or preceding administrations that creates a situation 
where a President–let’s just take the incumbent President and 1972–is not involved in the major 
decisionmaking situation” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3183).   
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 Senator Baker then said, “I believe in your statement you say the question is not what did 
the President know but how could the President have known” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3184).  He 
then explained to Haldeman the problem he had with that particular way of thinking, “[H]ere we 
are dealing with a matter that has turned out to be one of extraordinary importance” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 3184).  Senator Baker then forewent his “vote on final passage on the highway 
conference report” in order to continue his questioning, demonstrating his dedication to the 
hearings (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3185).   
Senator Baker then turned his focus to the immediate White House reaction to learning of 
the Watergate break-in (“Hearings”, 1973).  He then inquired into whether President Nixon’s 
delegation of political responsibility meant more work for Haldeman (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Haldeman answered, “Not mine personally as long as I was satisfied that other people were 
doing so, and on a satisfactory basis and that I was so satisfied” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3186).   
Senator Baker then espoused a Senator Ervin analogy to ask about the past in order to 
figure out how to improve the future: 
Let’s adopt the lightning bug . . . theorem that the chairman alluded to in the most 
colorful terms.  As you know the lightning bug illuminates from behind and has a 
better view in retrospect than he does about where he is going.  I don’t know 
where we are going but looking at it in retrospect, could you devise a situation for 
us, or can you conjure up a set of affairs where a President would be more keenly 
in tune with the political consequences of a situation and still not neglect his 
foreign policy and domestic initiative?  Can you see how it might have been 
handled differently?  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3186) 
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Haldeman responded, “I don’t think you can lay out a formula, Senator Baker, that is a way that 
a President’s office should be staffed or conducted that will solve the problems that might arise” 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3187).   
 Senator Baker wrapped up this round of questioning by examining the political 
responsibility of the President (“Hearings”, 1973).  In this regard, Haldeman stated:  “I would not 
say he [President Nixon] withdrew from the political scene.  I would say he withdrew from the 
mechanics of the operation of his political campaign” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3187).  This 
response led Senator Baker to ask, “Are we about to draw the inference that maybe it is 
necessary for a President to be more involved in the nitty-gritty of politics in a campaign?”, to 
which Haldeman replied in the negative (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3187).  Drawing upon an opening 
statement intention, Senator Baker concluded this round of questioning with an eye towards 
improving the future, “[Y]ou might think about how you would have gone about designing a 
system that would have prevented this” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3188). 
 In his next round of questioning, Senator Baker started right where he left off – with an 
eye towards improving the future (“Hearings”, 1973).  He asked Haldeman, “How on earth can 
we reinject Presidential presence from the political standpoint or a staff rearrangement so if this 
thing were ever to come up again, someone would zap it before it got out of hand” (“Hearings”, 
1973, p. 3199).  Haldeman responded by informing Senator Baker that it was his belief that it 
was more of a campaign problem than it was a problem with the institution of the Presidency 
(“Hearings”, 1973). 
 In response to a question from Sam Dash, Wilson asked Senator Baker, “Mr. Vice 
Chairman, what is the relevancy of this inquiry?”, to which Senator Baker deferred to Dash 
(“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3208).  After a brief heated exchange, Senator Baker came to Dash’s 
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defense, “Mr. Wilson, I think we will really get to the relevancy of it quicker if we let Mr. Dash 
proceed” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3208).  
 Senator Baker later addressed Wilson’s motion pertaining to Senator Inouye (“Hearings”, 
1973).  Wilson described the reasons for his motion, “[T]he things that were said, the questions 
that were asked, which were highly irrelevant . . . are going out to the world as a part of the 
record of this case, and this comes from a man who also called my client, John Ehrlichman, a liar 
over national television” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3229).  Senator Baker proposed that the 
committee “see what he [Wilson] has in mind and reserve the right to treat it either in public 
session or in executive session as the facts and merits may indicate” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3229).  
Senator Ervin agreed with Senator Baker’s proposal (“Hearings”, 1973). 
 The next day, prior to the introduction of the next witness, Senator Baker defended 
Senator Inouye:   
I do not know anyone on this committee who has made a greater contribution to 
its efforts than Senator Inouye.  I have a great affection for him as well as a great 
admiration for him.  We are in a tension-filled atmosphere and it is unfortunate 
that things of this sort occur.  (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3232) 
A glimpse into the work of Senator Baker’s staff shows that Senator Baker, throughout 
his questioning of Haldeman, touched on the following prospective topics for Haldeman’s 
testimony listed in a preparatory memo sent from Howard Liebengood to Fred Thompson:  
Ulasewicz, use of funds, intelligence operations (specifically, surveillance of Kennedy), and the 
tapes (H. Liebengood, personal communication, July 25, 1973 & “Hearings”, 1973).  Senator 
Baker’s underlying theme for his questioning of H. R. Haldeman was the White House’s 
seemingly nonchalant response to the Watergate break-in (“Hearings”, 1973).  He also made 
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clear his negative take on executive privilege and explained the necessity for the committee to 
gain access to the Nixon tapes (“Hearings”, 1973).  As always, Senator Baker posed his central 
question, “[W]hat did the President know and when did he know it?”, while also placing an 
emphasis on figuring out how to improve the future (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 3088).  While tensions 
seemed to be flying high throughout the course of Haldeman’s testimony, Senator Baker often 
placed himself in the position of referee (“Hearings”, 1973).  The unity between Senator Baker 
and Senator Ervin was obvious throughout Haldeman’s testimony, as well (“Hearings”, 1973).  
Senator Baker’s questioning of Haldeman aligned with his opening statement, because his clear 
desire to obtain the tapes exemplifies his desire to gather as many facts as possible; Senator 
Baker said, “I can’t resist the temptation to find out all we can find out” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 
3066). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 12 
 
 
Nixon:   “Baker will not be in this office again–do you understand that?” 
Haig:   “Yes sir.” 
- 7/12/1973 CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT (FOLLOWING HALDEMAN) GENERAL ALEXANDER M. 
HAIG, JR. (KUTLER, 1997, PP. X & 631) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FINAL REPORT 
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 Less than a week after Haldeman’s testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities concluded, “the first phase of hearings ended” (United States, 
1974, p. 96).  By this point, “the break-in, the details of the coverup, and much more had been 
revealed” (United States, 1974, p. 96).  Future witnesses to appear before the committee would 
not have been directly involved in the break-in or cover-up (“Hearings”, 1973).  Then in the 
early part of 1974, Leon Jaworski, who was serving as Special Prosecutor, “asked the committee 
to postpone releasing its final report so as to not unduly influence the criminal cases he was 
preparing against former White House staff” (“Senate”, p. 3).  Once “[t]he House Judiciary 
Committee launched an impeachment inquiry”, the committee decided it was time to step out of 
the spotlight; they “voted unanimously on February 19, 1974, to conclude public hearings and 
complete the committee’s remaining tasks in private sessions” (“Senate”, p. 3).  The final report 
was released on June 27, 1974 (“Senate”). 
 According to the report itself: 
The Watergate drama is still unfolding.  Because all the facts are not yet in, 
because all the Watergate criminal trials and the impeachment proceeding are not 
concluded, and because the President has refused to produce to the Select 
Committee many crucial tape recordings and other evidence, this report–although 
it is the committee’s final report–is incomplete.  (United States, 1974, p. 1)  
 The committee, in its final report, made several committee-wide recommendations 
regarding Watergate (United States, 1974).  The first was “that Congress enact legislation to 
establish a permanent Office of Public Attorney which would have jurisdiction to prosecute 
criminal cases in which there is a real or apparent conflict of interest within the executive 
branch” (United States, 1974, p. 96).   
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The second was that: 
Congress should treat as a separate Federal offense, with separate penalties, any 
felony defined in the code (except those felonies that specifically relate to Federal 
elections) that is committed with the purpose of interfering with or affecting the 
outcome of a Federal election or nominating process.  (United States, 1974, p. 
100) 
 The third recommendation read: 
The committee recommends that Congress enact legislation making it unlawful 
for any employee in the Executive Office of the President, or assigned to the 
White House, directly or indirectly to authorize or engage in any investigative or 
intelligence gathering activity concerning national or domestic security not 
authorized by Congress.  (United States, 1974, p. 101) 
 The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities then suggested, in its 
fourth recommendation, “that the appropriate congressional oversight committees should more 
closely supervise the operations of the intelligence and law enforcement “community” (United 
States, 1974, p. 101). 
 The fifth recommendation read: 
  The committee recommends that Congress amend: 
(1) The false declaration prohibition of 18 U.S.C. sec. 1623 to make it 
equally applicable to congressional proceedings under oath. 
(2) Section 1621 of Title 18 to provide that, once the oath has been 
properly administered by a Congressman in a public or private 
congressional hearing, it is not a defense to a perjury charge that 
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subsequently a quorum was absent or no Congressman was present 
when the perjurious statement was made.  (United States, 1974, p. 
102) 
The sixth recommendation was a call for restraint: 
The committee recommends that the Congress refrain from adopting proposed 
revisions of title 18 which would unjustifiably broaden the present defenses to 
criminal charges of official mistake of law and execution of public duty.  (United 
States, 1974, p. 103) 
The seventh and final recommendation made by the Senate Select Committee on 
Campaign Activities regarding Watergate read: 
The committee recommends that the appropriate committees of Congress study 
and reconsider title III of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968 for the 
purpose of determining whether the electronic surveillance provisions contained 
in that act require revision or amendment.  (United States, 1974, p. 104) 
 Senator Baker began his individual section of the Final Report with the following: 
I believe that the activities and inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities have been, by and large, useful and appropriate.  
The bipartisan tone for the committee was established by the unanimous adoption 
of Senate Resolution 60 by the vote of 77 to 0 on February 7, 1973.  I think, with 
some exceptions that bipartisan attitude was preserved throughout the long and 
tedious proceedings.  (United States, 1974, p. 1105) 
Senator Baker also set forth his own recommendations (United States, 1974).  Senator 
Baker’s first recommendation was to establish “an Office of Public Prosecutor within the 
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Department of Justice, appointed by the President for a fixed term and subject to Senate 
confirmation” (United States, 1974, p. 1105).  His second recommendation was to establish 
“within the Congress of a Joint Intelligence Oversight Committee so as to provide for increased 
congressional monitoring of governmental intelligence-gathering activities” (United States, 
1974, p. 1106).  Thirdly, he called for a “[r]eformation of congressional investigatory hearings 
procedures so as to provide increased protection for the rights of individuals” (United States, 
1974, p. 1107).  Senator Baker also called for an “[i]ncreased national party committee role in 
Federal elections” (United States, 1974, p. 1114). 
Senator Baker also contributed to the Final Report a summarization of “the highlights of 
an investigation of CIA activity, if any, in connection with the Watergate incident and aftermath”  
(United States, 1974, p. 1115).  This section of the Final Report was “designed to generally 
describe the areas of interest and concern pursued during the staff investigation and executive 
session interviews since the conclusion of the Committee’s public hearings” (United States, 
1974, p. 1115).  This section concludes with “the recommendations of the staff for further 
inquiry” (United States, 1974, p. 1117). 
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PART III 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 13 
 
 
Nixon:   “I think it’s despicable conduct and I just don’t understand how, out of Tennessee or something. . . 
. [John Mitchell’s] helped all these guys, including Howard Baker–” 
Timmons:  “That’s right.” 
Nixon:  “–he’s held their hands, he’s appointed their nominees and the rest, and for him to treat him like a 
common criminal was inexcusable.  He’s finished.  Absolutely totally finished”. 
- 7/12/1973 CONVERSATION WITH WHITE HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON WILLIAM E. TIMMONS (KUTLER, 1997, PP. XII & 
633) 
 
SENATOR BAKER IN THE PRESS 
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In this portion of my paper, I examine various accounts of Senator Baker’s performance 
as Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
throughout the press during the Watergate public hearings.  John Pierson of The Wall Street 
Journal described Senator Baker on June 7, 1973, as “young (47), smart, good-looking, 
moderate” and that his “good looks are beginning to get to the women out there in television 
land” (Pierson, 1973, p. 1).  The love was not gender specific, however; Pierson continued, 
“Even the men seem impressed with his ability to walk the thin line between being a loyal 
Republican and asking tough questions of the Watergate gang” (Pierson, 1973, p. 1).  The 
following day, Horace Newcomb of The Baltimore Sun said that “[t]he brightest of these new 
stars” on the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities “is undoubtedly 
Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee” (Newcomb, 1973, p. B5).  He goes on to describe Senator 
Baker’s focus on the “ancient question of individual responsibility”: 
Always he is cool.  He waits.  His questions are often reaching to the heart of 
Watergate, but it is a different heart than that represented by the machinations of 
spys [sic] and mercenaries.  He is probing for the moral center of the issue.  
Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that he is probing toward the lack of a center, 
toward the moral void that allowed the situation to develop in the beginning. 
(Newcomb, 1973, p. B5) 
Robert Shogan of the Los Angeles Times also expressed his favorable opinion towards 
Senator Baker in a June 17, 1973, article, in which he propounded that Senator Baker, whom he 
described as “folksy, with telegenic boyish looks”, had “made a significant contribution to the 
hearings” (Shogan, 1973, p. 10).  He further described Senator Baker’s questioning style as 
“adroit, precise and usually good-natured” and found that he had a talent for “piercing the fog of 
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statistics and hearsay to reach underlying moral issues” (Shogan, 1973, p. 10).  That same day, 
Mary McGrory of the Boston Globe called Senator Baker “a prosecutor with charm, probing but 
pleasant” (McGrory, 1973, p. A6).  She seemed to think Senator Baker’s role on the committee 
had boosted his own chances to become President, “[I]n contrast with the other 1976 
possibilities, he is running like Secretariat” (McGrory, 1973, p. A6).   
Gilbert Lewthwaite, in his July 1, 1973, article in The Baltimore Sun said:  “The White 
House itself apparently hoped that Senator Baker would be co-operative and actually drew up a 
plan to woo him.  It did little good” (Lewthwaite, 1973, p. K1).  He added that Senator Baker 
“has established himself as one of the panel’s sharpest members.  His pre-session commitment to 
follow the trail of truth wherever it might lead has been translated into pointed questions and 
pithy comments” (Lewthwaite, 1973, K3).   
Senator Baker also received letters from the public “at the rate of about 300 a day” 
throughout the course of the hearings (Sperling, Jr., 1973, p. 16).  One particularly glowing 
review came in a letter that read: 
It’s rather ironic that my first fan letter in my life (I’m 62 and a Democrat) should 
be to a young Republican.  I have been impressed with your thorough and 
unbiased handling of the witnesses, and your in-depth probing of the whys and 
wherefores of this mess.  I hope you consider running for the presidency.  You’re 
young, vigorous, and fair minded.  We surely need this!  (Sperling, Jr., 1973, p. 
16) 
Representative William Wampler (R–VA), Senator Baker’s brother-in-law, provided a 
look into how Senator Baker’s family thought of his performance as top Republican on the 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities; Wampler “always felt Howard 
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was presidential caliber” and believed that “the Watergate hearings could very well escalate him 
into the limelight sufficiently for him to become a presidential aspirant” (Lewthwaite, 1973, p. 
K3). 
The perceptions of Vice-Chairman Baker weren’t all positive, however.  Senator Baker 
remarked that some people said he “should hush up and come back home to Tennessee and 
practice law again” (Sperling, Jr., 1973, p. 16).  He explained, “Many are saying I am using my 
office to crucify the President” (Sperling, Jr., 1973, p. 16).  One negative letter from a New York 
City woman wrote:   
We never heard of you before, and we wish we had not heard of you now.  And it 
would be a great service to the nation if you and all the members of your great 
investigation committee would get yourselves off TV and from the pages of the 
newspaper.  You do not seem to have a particle of judgment now that you are in 
‘show business.’ You are only thinking about this big opportunity of getting to be 
known across the land.  (Sperling Jr., 1973, p. 16)   
Another letter opened with, “Dear Fellow Democrat (I can’t believe that you are a Republican)” 
(Sperling, Jr., 1973, p. 16).  An even more spiteful letter read, “I am wondering what your father-
in-law would think of you at this point” (Sperling, Jr., 1973, p. 16).   
Jim Squires of the Chicago Tribune, on August 1, 1973, said that “Baker struck out” with 
“a thinly disguised slap at Ervin for making a preliminary judgment on the weight of Haldeman’s 
testimony” (Squires, 1973, p. 4).  Squires continued by saying that Senator Baker, along with the 
rest of the committee “had shown a national television audience what most close observers had 
known for some time–that the Watergate committee investigation is far from being the 
nonpartisan love affair it has often pretended to be” (Squires, 1973, p. 4). 
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 While both positive and negative opinions were expressed, it seems that the majority of 
reviews on Senator Baker’s performance as Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities were positive.  That being said, the real question is how did 
Senator Baker judge his own performance?  In a 2008 interview, Senator Baker said, “[T]hat’s 
what I tried to do, and I think by-and-large I succeeded in doing – that is, following the facts 
wherever they led” (Lacy, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 14 
 
 
Nixon: “Howard has no excuse, Howard’s smart enough to know better.  He also owes a great deal to all 
of us.  I’ve campaigned for the sonofabitch time and time again.  He’s been in here; we’ve done 
favors for him.  He’s not gonna get away with this now.” 
 - 7/12/1973 CONVERSATION WITH WHITE HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON WILLIAM E. TIMMONS (CONT.) (KUTLER, 1997, 
PP. XII & 633) 
 
VERDICT 
 
 
 
I find that there were two distinct phases in Senator Baker’s approach to the investigation 
conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities into the 
Watergate affair.  The meeting between Senator Baker and President Nixon of February 22, 
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1973, shifted Senator Baker’s thinking and, thus, serves as the divide between the two phases 
(Annis, 2007).  During the first phase, Senator Baker simply viewed the Watergate affair as a 
political dirty trick conducted by the Democrats to temper the Republican momentum after their 
dominating 1972 Presidential election performance (Annis, 2007).  He, thus, thought it was his 
responsibility to shield President Nixon from this Democratic onslaught (Lacy, 2008).  This 
phase was short-lived, however.   
Once President Nixon informed Senator Baker during the meeting as to John Mitchell’s 
potential problematic situation, the second phase began as Senator Baker resolved that he might, 
in fact, not know all there is to know regarding the Watergate affair (Annis, 2007).  “I had only 
the personal prejudice and the political prejudice in favor of Nixon, but when it came home to 
me in that conversation that there was more to it”, the act of “balancing what was right for the 
country”, meaning the discovery of the unadulterated facts of the Watergate affair, with “a 
partisan political loyalty and responsibility”, according to Senator Baker, “wasn’t difficult at all” 
(Lacy, 2008).  Senator Baker’s insistence upon President Nixon during that meeting to be as 
open as possible exemplified Senator Baker’s stance on executive privilege contrary to that of 
President Nixon and parallel to that of Sam Ervin (Annis, 2007). 
Senator Baker decided that he and his staff should follow each lead they find and “let the 
chips fall where they may” (Annis, 2007, p. 63).  It is also important to keep in mind that those 
aides on Senator Baker’s staff were chosen not based on White House suggestions but, instead, 
for having “first loyalties [that] were to the truth and to him” (Annis, 2007, p. 62).  Once the 
hearings actually commenced, Senator Baker upheld his opening statement promise “to proceed 
with the business of discovering the facts” with his plethora of questions aimed at the heart of the 
details surrounding the Watergate break-in and its subsequent cover-up (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6).  
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Throughout this fact-finding process, Senator Baker did not attempt to divert attention away 
from the President; rather, he made a concentrated effort to publicly uncover all he could 
regarding the President and his knowledge surrounding the Watergate affair, even to the point of 
making it his central focus over the course of the hearings (“Hearings”, 1973).  He even set forth 
the motion to sue the President over his refusal to provide tapes to the committee (“Hearings”, 
1973). 
There were, however, a couple signs over the course of the hearings that could be 
construed as Senator Baker aiming to protect President Nixon (“Hearings”, 1973).  For instance, 
some people might point to Baker’s frequent commendatory nature towards witnesses as 
potential signs of Senator Baker’s pro-Nixon stance throughout the hearings (“Hearings”, 1973).  
I, however, chalk these complimentary comments up to simple acts of civility on the part of 
Senator Baker (“Hearings”, 1973).  Others still might point to Senator Baker’s public 
disagreements with Sam Dash as being partisan-driven and, thus, pro-Nixon; I, on the other 
hand, do not read much into these Baker-Dash clashes, as I believe they can simply be attributed 
to occasional stylistic differences between the two men (“Hearings”, 1973).  I believe that these 
signs, however, are heavily outweighed by the numerous pieces of evidence pointing towards 
Senator Baker’s desire to uncover the unadulterated facts surrounding the Watergate affair; 
therefore, it is my verdict that Senator Baker, throughout the course of the hearings, did, in fact, 
tip the balance in favor of discovering the whole truth at the expense of potentially aiding in the  
exposure of the wrongdoings of President Nixon and his staff before an immense television 
audience (“Hearings”, 1973).   
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CHAPTER 15 
 
 
Nixon:   “Howard Baker, Rose, I have no hatred at this time, I have no hatred here. . . . But I remember 
loyalty.  Howard Baker will never be in the White House again, as long as I am in this office.  
Never, never, never”. 
. . .  
Nixon:  “Baker will never be in this office again.  He’ll never be in the White House again.  I mean it, 
Rose.” 
Woods: “I, I agree with that, too.” 
Nixon: “His name will not be on the Christmas list; there will never, never ever be Baker in the White 
House as long as I’m here.” 
 - 7/12/1973 CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY ROSE MARY WOODS (KUTLER, 1997, PP. XII & 634) 
 
AFTERWORD & SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
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As the summer of 1974 progressed, things began getting even worse for President Nixon 
(“Watergate”, 2013).  The United States Supreme Court, on July 24, ruled that President Nixon 
had to give up the tapes (“Watergate”, 2013).  Just a few days later, the Judiciary Committee of 
the United States House of Representatives “passed three articles of impeachment” 
(“Watergate”, 2013).  President Nixon, on August 5, released “transcripts of three tapes that 
clearly implicated him in the cover-up” and, thus, lost his bare thread of Congressional support 
(“Watergate”, 2013).  Nixon resigned from the office of the Presidency on August 8 
(“Watergate”, 2013).   
Looking back on the Watergate affair more than three decades later, Senator Baker said, 
“[E]ven today when I think back on it, I get shivers” (Lacy, 2008).  He referred to the time as 
both “extraordinary” and “terrible” (Lacy, 2008).  Senator Baker explained: 
[E]very day, almost, that it went forward I began to understand that, once again, 
there are forces here I don’t understand.  And the circumstances tumbled over 
each other, and it got worse and worse.  And it wasn’t until long I realized that we 
had a big, first-class problem on our hands – not just a political problem.  (Lacy, 
2008) 
Senator Baker, however, saw both “a good side and bad side” to Watergate (Lacy, 2008).  
He explained, “The good side, clearly, was that it showed that the political system in America 
works – that it was able to focus on the allegations, the charges, against Richard Nixon and to 
deal with them in a methodical and careful and judicial way” (Lacy, 2008).  Another bright spot 
“was that the system . . . recovered” (Lacy, 2008).  Senator Baker continued, “[W]e were able to 
continue doing the country’s business . . . and continue with the political system . . .  and not be 
put off or disillusioned to the extent that people dropped out” (Lacy, 2008).  In fact, Senator 
TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS Borns 77
Baker added, “More people participate in politics now than before Watergate” (Lacy, 2008).  It, 
thus, seems that the nation was able to avoid the “public disillusionment with partisan politics” 
that Senator Baker referred to in his opening statement as potentially “the greatest Watergate 
casualty of all” (“Hearings”, 1973, p. 6). 
According to Senator Baker, “One of the bad things was that it created a whole corps of 
reporters who wanted to be the champion of this inquiry” (Lacy, 2008).  He believes “that the 
alleged transgression of political figures is often exaggerated in an effort to analogize it to 
Watergate”, but he added, “I don’t think you’ll see an analogy to Watergate in my lifetime” 
(Lacy, 2008).  As Monica Hesse of The Washington Post cleverly expounded, “All of the 
salacious occurrences of the world . . . have been corralled together to reside in one vast gated 
community” (Hesse, 2012). 
On another note, I find that a key component to the success of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities was the political moderateness of the two men in 
charge – Senator Ervin and Senator Baker.  Their not-too-distant political views enabled them to 
effectively work together in leading a bipartisan committee to impartially investigate the 
Watergate affair.  In today’s extreme partisan political climate that urges, if not forces, current 
and would-be politicians to distance themselves from the “moderate” moniker, a similar 
partnership would be much less likely and increased political bickering throughout the course of 
the investigation would, thus, be much more likely.  For example, the December 2012 Benghazi 
hearings “morphed into a political face-off . . . as Democrats and Republicans sought to position 
themselves and their parties for the months and years ahead” (Soloman & Gorman, 2012).  I 
recommend that our nation’s future political leaders and the American citizenry as a whole draw 
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upon the bipartisan spirit of both Senators Baker and Ervin in order to minimize the effects of the 
partisan gridlock that is all too prevalent in today’s political landscape. 
Following Watergate, Senator Baker would go on to become Senate Minority Leader, 
Senate Majority Leader, Chief of Staff to President Ronald Reagan, and United States 
Ambassador to Japan.  Throughout it all, Senator Baker brought people together in order to solve 
problems in his warm and lighthearted, yet powerful Tennessee manner.  The world we live in 
today surely could use a few more Howard Bakers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
  
 
 
Annis, Jr., J. L.  (2007).  Howard Baker:  Conciliator in an age of crisis (2nd ed.).  Knoxville:  
The University of Tennessee. 
Baker, Howard Henry, Jr., (1925 – ).  Retrieved from 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000063 
Ervin, Jr., S. J.  (1980).  The whole truth:  The Watergate conspiracy.  New York:  Random 
House.  
TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS Borns 79
Ervin, Samuel James, Jr., (1896 – 1985).  Retrieved from 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000211 
Garay, R.  (n.d.).  Watergate.  The Museum of Broadcast Communications.  Retrieved from 
http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=watergate 
Gurney, Edward John, (1914 – 1996).  Retrieved from 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000531 
Hearings before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United States 
Senate (Vols. 1-9).  (1973).  Dallas, TX:  The Leslie Press. 
Hesse, M.  (2012, June 10).  We can’t have a scandal without the –gate.  The Washington Post.  
Retrieved from http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-
10/lifestyle/35461407_1_troopergate-monicagate-russian-river 
Inouye, Daniel Ken, (1924 – 2012).  Retrieved from http:// 
bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=I000025 
Kutler, S. I.  (1997).  Abuse of power:  The new Nixon tapes.  New York, NY:  Touchstone.   
Lacy, W. (Interviewer) & Baker, H. (Interviewee).  (2008).  Minds That Matter [Self-created 
interview transcript from video].  Retrieved from iTunes U via KTWU Channel 11 – 
Kansas Public Television 
Lewthwaite, G. A.  (1973, July 1).  Bright Baker and his boom.  The Baltimore Sun, p. K3.  
Retrieved from Proquest. 
Liebengood, H.  Personal communication, July 25, 1973. 
MacPherson, M.  (1973, June 24).  The public interrogator, the personal man.  The Washington 
Post, p. K1.  Retrieved from Proquest. 
TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS Borns 80
McGrory, M.  (1973, June 17).  Baker now GOP idol, but impartial?  Boston Globe, p. A6.  
Retrieved from Proquest. 
Montoya, Joseph Manuel, (1915 – 1978).  Retrieved from 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000876 
Pierson, J.  (1973, June 7).  In the limelight:  men on the Ervin panel find Watergate probe is 
affecting them, too.  The Wall Street Journal, p. 1.  Retrieved from Proquest. 
Rosen, J.  (2012).  Justice Howard Baker.  Baker Center Journal of Applied Public Policy, 4(2), 
49–53. 
Samuel Dash : Biography.  Retrieved from http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKdashS.htm 
Senate Historical Office.  Hugh Scott:  A featured biography.  Retrieved from 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Featured_Bio_ScottHugh.h
tm 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (The Watergate Committee), U.S. 
Senate Historical Office, Washington, D.C.  Retrieved from 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/pdf/Watergate_inves
tigation_citations.pdf 
Shogan, R.  (1973, June 17).  Ervin, Baker share limelight in probe.  Los Angeles Times, p. 10.  
Retrieved from Proquest. 
Soloman, J. & Gorman, S.  (2012, December 20).  In Benghazi hearings, partisan politics play 
out.  The Wall Street Journal.  Retrieved from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324461604578191184115612280.html   
Sperling Jr., G.  (1973, July 28).  Senator Baker:  ‘better than a dark horse’.  The Christian 
Science Monitor, p. 16.  Retrieved from Proquest. 
TIGHTROPE:  SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. DURING THE WATERGATE PUBLIC HEARINGS Borns 81
Squires, J.  (1973, August 1).  Sen. Baker shows new look—tough, combative.  Chicago 
Tribune, p. 4.  Retrieved from Proquest. 
Squires, J.  (1973, June 24).  Sen. Baker gets political boost from Watergate.  Chicago Tribune, 
p. 10.  Retrieved from Proquest.  (The title of this thesis partially comes from this article.) 
Talmadge, Herman Eugene, (1913 – 2002).  Retrieved from 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000035 
Thompson, Fred Dalton, (1942 – ).  Retrieved from 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000457 
United States Senate.  (1974).  The final report of the Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities (Report No. 93-981).  Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing 
Office.  Retrieved from 
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=144965&relPage
Id=1      
Vaughan, S. R. & Bramhall, D.  (1989).  Tightrope [Recorded by Stevie Ray Vaughan].  CBS 
Records Inc.  (Lyrics from this song inspired the title of this thesis.) 
Watergate scandal.  (2013).  In Encyclopædia Britannica.  Retrieved from Proquest at 
http://www.britannica.com /EBchecked/topic/637431/Watergate-scandal 
Weicker, Lowell Palmer, Jr., (1931 – ).  Retrieved from 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000253 
 
 
